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ABSTRACT 
Every June, the 30 clubs of Major League Baseball gather on a conference call to 
select amateur players from high school and college into their organization. These players 
may be position players or pitchers, and when selected, the players are awarded a signing 
bonus to entice them to join the organization. Using regression techniques and statistical 
tests, position players will be compared to pitchers as well as high school players to 
college players in terms of return on investment. First multiple regression techniques are 
used to develop a model to determine what a player’s value is to his team based off of his 
marginal revenue product (MRP). This value is then compared to yearly compensation 
including initial signing bonus for the player’s pre-arbitration seasons. The difference in 
total MRP and total compensation formulate a return on investment. These distributions 
of returns on investment are compared by group using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov procedure. 
When performed, it is found that there is no statistical difference in return by position 
outside of a rare exception in 2005 where position players significantly outperformed 
pitchers in the first round. There is statistical evidence suggesting college players return 
higher returns on investment on average than high school players in all rounds, but when 
broken down by position, the significance only holds for infielders and outfielders. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
Major League Baseball is America’s oldest professional sports league, dating 
back to 1869. While the game itself has gone through some changes over the years such 
as moving fences in on playing fields to increase homeruns, and decreasing the amount of 
innings starting pitchers are allowed to throw in a season, the sport of baseball as a whole 
is not much different today than when greats like Babe Ruth donned Yankee pinstripes in 
the 1920s. That said, where baseball has changed drastically in recent times is in how the 
game is thought of and analyzed from a front office perspective. The days of simply 
looking at the back of a baseball player’s trading card and evaluating his batting average 
or earned run average to successfully value a player’s worth are over, as Bill James’ 
creation of sabermetrics in the mid 1990s has led to a revolution of in depth statistical 
analysis of Major League Baseball. In this paper, some of the concepts developed by 
these sabermatricians will be utilized in conjunction with economic theory to investigate 
the Major League Baseball Rule IV Draft. The first part of this paper will analyze various 
methods of valuing a player, eventually settling on a model that will produce a player’s 
worth to his team based off of quantifiable statistics. After that, metrics will be selected 
as the basis for which to be inserted into the model, for means of comparison between 
what a player was worth and what the player was actually paid for that season. Finally, 
drafted players can be compared for differences in return on investment between hitters 
and pitchers as well as between high school and college players to see if there are any 
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groups of athletes that have performed significantly better than others, leading to a 
possible optimal drafting strategy for teams. 
 The MLB Rule IV Draft is a conference call that takes place every June between 
the 30 MLB clubs. During this call, the teams take turns in a specified order based off of 
the previous year’s standings, selecting amateur players eligible to be drafted. According 
to the MLB’s official website, these eligible players include, “high school players who 
have graduated and have not yet attended college, college players from four-year colleges 
who have completed either their junior or senior years or are at least 21 years old, and 
junior college players regardless of how many years of school completed” (MLB). 
Additionally, these players must be residents of the United States, Canada, or a United 
States territory such as Puerto Rico to be eligible. Once players are selected, a club 
retains this player’s rights until August 15th, where they must try and come to terms on a 
signing bonus and ensuing contract to entice the player to join their organization. These 
signing bonuses vary, and are typically higher based off of what round the player was 
selected in, but this is not always the case. There are times when teams look to save 
money by drafting a player they know will sign for less, and times when high spending 
teams roll the dice on athletes later in the draft who have fallen because of teams’ 
concerns over the player’s “signability”, or actual probability of agreeing to forgo other 
athletic opportunities such as college baseball or football in favor of joining a minor 
league system. 
 Unlike other sports such as the National Basketball Association, and the National 
Football League, most players selected in the MLB Rule IV Draft are not immediately 
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ready to produce on a big league club. Many of these players are drafted for their raw 
skills, and are expected to need some time developing in minor league systems, 
sometimes for time periods close to a decade. For this reason, MLB draftees can be 
looked at as investments made by their teams. The teams usually sign the player to a 
signing bonus that reaches levels of a major league salary, however, outside of a few rare 
exceptions, they pay them very small annual salaries until they are eligible for salary 
arbitration. In other words, MLB teams pay a relatively high fee up front to acquire the 
player, but then they have a window of time pre arbitration to recoup their investment, as 
well as produce additional value. Because of the nature of the draft, however, there is 
volatility on these returns, as some players pan out in a big way, while others with high 
expectations never even make it to the major leagues for various reasons. While previous 
research has concluded that on average, drafted players provide a significant return to 
their clubs, there remains the question on whether or not there is a group of players that 
maximize this return relative to another. Using economic theory as a guide, if the MLB 
Draft is operating efficiently, players’ compensation in the form of signing bonuses and 
salary should be a representation of their expected contribution to their club, and thus, 
there should be no exploitable group of players that teams can pick from that would 
provide a better return on investment than another. However, this paper will investigate 
whether that theory truly holds in this platform.  
 In the draft, MLB teams can select from different groups of players. The first 
group is classified by position. MLB teams, at its simplest form can select either pitchers 
or position players. Additionally, within the position player group, there are subgroups by 
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actual position, such as infielders, outfielders, and catchers. Along with this, there are two 
distinct age groups to select from. The first is high school players. These players are 
usually 18 years old, and are typically thought of as high upside prospects in need of 
some professional coaching to maximize potential. The second group is college players. 
These players vary in age from 19 to 24, and while they are thought to be more pro ready 
than their high school counterparts on average, they come at a price of added age, and 
potentially smaller upside. Given these various different groups of players to pick from, 
MLB front offices are tasked with the job of trying to determine if there is an optimal 
strategy for what type of player they should select in certain draft positions on the basis 
of return on investment, and it is the goal of this paper to dive into that question in more 
detail. If economic theory holds, and players are compensated at a consistent rate 
between groups for their future performance in the form of signing bonuses and salaries, 
my hypothesis that there will be no exploitable drafting strategy should be proven true in 
this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   5	  
CHAPTER TWO 
Determining a Player’s Value 
 One of the core hurdles this analysis must overcome is determining what a 
player’s value is to a major league team. If a player’s value can be calculated, this total 
can then be compared to the player’s compensation to formulate a return. This is 
fundamental in the ability to evaluate draft picks in the second part of the paper. 
Fortunately, this idea has been studied previously by many sports economists. The classic 
paper on this topic, and the one that is most heavily referenced and talked about is Gerald 
Scully’s 1974 paper titled, “Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball.” The basis 
of Scully’s research, is that if the baseball labor market was perfectly competitive, “the 
player salaries would be equated with player marginal revenue products (MRP)” (Scully 
1974). This is rooted in a basic labor economic theory that salaries should reflect the 
additional revenue added by the worker. Scully goes on to explain that teams’ winning 
percentage is a function of “a vector of player skills,” and, “a vector of other non player 
inputs such as managers, coaches, capital, etc.” (Scully 1974). Additionally, he states 
that, “teams derive revenue essentially from two main sources: gate receipts and the sale 
of radio and television rights” (Scully 1974). What Scully concludes, then, is that gate 
receipts and broadcasting rights increase as a function of win percentage, and seeing as 
win percentage increases as a function of player skills, these player performances have an 
impact on total revenue realized by the team.  
While Scully concedes determining a player’s MRP is not an easy task, one can 
determine a player’s impact on winning, and then determine the impact of winning on 
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revenue, resulting in a crude estimate on what the player’s MRP actually is, and thus 
what his salary should be in a perfectly competitive market. Scully then goes on to 
estimate two different linear regression models, the first regressing winning percentage as 
a dependent variable as a function of the independent variables of team slugging average, 
team strikeout-to-walk ratio, league, contender status, and status as a habitual winner or 
loser.  In this instance, Scully uses slugging average as a proxy for total offensive 
contribution and strikeout-to-walk ratio as a proxy for pitching. The second model Scully 
estimates is a linear model regressing team revenue on winning percentage, market size, 
team differences in attendance over time, league, stadium age, and percentage of minority 
players. When both of these models have been estimated, Scully takes the coefficient on 
slugging average from the first model and multiplies that by the coefficient of winning 
percentage on the second model to determine the MRP of an offensive player per point of 
slugging average. He does the same for pitchers, however, he uses strikeout-to-walk ratio 
instead of slugging average. In other words, in the Scully model, one can find the MRP 
for any player by simply having that players’ slugging average or strikeout-to-walk ratio 
and multiplying it by the value calculated from estimating the two previous regression 
models. 
While Scully’s paper was innovative in how people thought about professional 
player salaries, as Scully points out himself in future work, “one needs to be cautious 
about the results, since the estimates of player marginal products are crude” (Scully 
1989). In other words, the Scully model needs some updating and retooling to be an 
effective model to measure MLB players’ value. One economist, Anthony Krautmann 
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discards Scully’s method altogether in his paper, “What’s Wrong With Scully-Estimates 
of a Player’s Marginal Revenue Product.” The basis of Krautmann’s argument is that at 
the time of Scully’s work, players were not permitted to become free agents. However, in 
the present day, a free agent market exists where players can be bid on by various teams, 
and thus, should receive compensation that aligns them with what their value is to teams. 
In Krautmann’s free market returns approach, he regresses free agents’ wages on their 
performance using an ex ante measure of a free agent’s performance, time trends, and a 
fixed-effects parameter for teams to control for “team-invariant factors, including 
managerial quality” (Krautmann 1999). By calculating this model, one can determine a 
player’s MRP without having to know a team’s revenue function, but rather by using past 
free agent information to essentially estimate what a player would be worth on the free 
market, and thus, what his value truly is.  
The Krautmann free market returns approach was directly challenged in a 
subsequent article written by John Charles Bradbury of Kennesaw State University in a 
paper titled, “What’s Right with Scully-Estimates of a Player’s Marginal Revenue 
Product.” Bradbury does concede flaws in the Scully method as explained by Krautmann, 
including the fact that Scully includes revenue that is shared amongst teams, and the 
revenues of MLB teams are never actually officially reported, and thus, the model is 
grounded in an estimated revenue value, which could lead to inaccurate results. However, 
Bradbury finds further flaws in Krautmann’s method, explaining that “the market prices 
on which the Krautmann model depends may not properly reflect players’ true marginal 
revenue contributions” (Bradbury 2013). He gives various examples of why this may be 
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the case, including, “the availability of cheap substitutes, players’ willingness to accept 
discounts for non-pecuniary wages and reduce risk, past evidence of inefficiency in 
professional sports labor markets, limited competition for player services, and the non-
linear relationship between performance and revenue” (Bradbury 2013) Because of this, 
Bradbury concludes that while the Krautmann method is a useful method to value 
players, a less flawed approach would be to create an updated version of Scully’s model 
to better reflect information and statistics available to today’s baseball researcher. 
Given the background information on this topic, it is clear that two different 
methods are available to use as player valuation techniques. The first, is described by 
Scully and supported by Bradbury, and this is a model that is based on team revenues. 
The second is the model described by Krautmann, which is grounded in a free agent 
market approach. While I see the value in Krautmann’s approach, I feel there are too 
many potential flaws in evaluating free agent salaries as a basis for MRP. The idea of free 
agent salaries determining a player’s value requires that players would accept the highest 
bid on them in free agency. This is simply not the case very often, as players take less 
money for longer deals, and for situations that they feel better fit themselves as players 
and individuals. While free agent salaries can help determine a player’s value, there are 
too many potential causes for error in the human element of offering and agreeing to 
compensation terms that leave me with reservations in using this approach. For that 
reason, the valuation approach used in this paper will be an updated version of Scully’s 
method, using a model created by Bradbury as a strong reference.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Model Methodology and Data Gathering 
 In order to determine a player’s MRP, a model had to be created to measure team 
revenue as a function of various different explanatory variables. As a reference for this 
type of model, I used J.C. Bradbury’s book Hot Stove Economics. Understanding 
Baseball’s Second Season. In this book, Bradbury attempts to create a model that is 
similar in theory to Scully’s MRP model; however, he tries to make it more precise and a 
better reflection of a player’s true value by updating the explanatory variables. As 
Bradbury explains, “a performance metric should be judged according to three criteria: 
(1) how it correlates with winning, (2) the degree to which it separates true ability from 
random chance, and (3) whether or not the information it conveys regarding performance 
matches reasonable intuition about what constitutes good performance” (Bradbury 2010). 
The performance metric that Bradbury finds correlates the strongest with winning is runs 
scored less runs allowed, also known as run differential. This is intuitive, as baseball is a 
game of scoring more runs than the other team. Because of this, if a team scores a lot 
more runs than it allows, the chances are high that it will win a lot more games than a 
team who does the opposite. When carrying this concept out further, Bradbury looks at 
the correlation of various offensive metrics such as batting average, on base percentage, 
and slugging average, and finds they correlate strongly with runs scored. Additionally, 
common pitching metrics such as earned run average, strikeout rate, and walk rate 
correlate strongly with runs allowed. For this reason, run differential served as a useful 
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metric, as it could represent winning percentage while still remaining a stat that would be 
quantifiable for individual performance.  
 Once Bradbury discovers that run differential serves as a good metric for a team’s 
ability to win, he then begins to construct a regression model to explain team revenue as a 
function of run differential and other tested factors. Bradbury collects team revenue from 
Forbes annual reports, adjusting by a constant amount to account for national revenue 
that is shared amongst each team, as including this value would artificially inflate MRP 
estimates. He tests various different factors, and finds that the only significant ones to 
include in his model are population of the metropolitan area of the team, and whether or 
not the team is playing in a relatively new ballpark. For the latter variable, Bradbury uses 
previous research to conclude additional revenue can be expected for a team playing in a 
ballpark that is eight years or younger, so he creates a dummy variable called honeymoon 
that receives a value of one for any team playing in a ballpark that fits this criteria. 
Finally, when investigating the relationship between run differential and team revenue, 
Bradbury finds the relationship is not linear. In fact, he finds that run differential has a 
greater positive effect on team revenue as run differential increases. This is intuitive, as it 
says winning games generates more revenue for teams that approach a certain threshold, 
most likely a playoff spot. If a team is on the verge of making the playoffs or winning a 
championship, each increased win would likely generate more revenue than a team who 
is out of contention, as fans are more likely to spend money to attend games and purchase 
merchandise for teams that are good. Bradbury combines all of this analysis to form a 
pooled panel regression model that estimates team revenue as a function of run 
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differential, the square of run differential, the cube of run differential, MSA population, 
and honeymoon status of the team’s ballpark. 
To create my model, I used very similar concepts to those explained by Bradbury, 
with a few minor alterations. The first alteration was the time period to be utilized. While 
Bradbury used the years 2003 to 2007, I planned on using a broader data set. For this 
reason the years 2000 to 2013 were utilized. Much like Bradbury, I gathered run 
differentials and winning percentages for teams over the 14-year window from ESPN’s 
website. As Figure A-1 shows, the relationship between both run differential and winning 
was strongly linear, and had a correlation of 93%. Given this information, it was clear 
that much like Bradbury’s model, run differential would serve as a sound proxy for win 
percentage.  
The team revenue data was gathered from various different Forbes Business of 
Baseball Reports over the 14-year period. These values were raw revenue and had to be 
adjusted for inflation. To do this, all revenue values were converted to 2013 US dollars 
by using CPI indices for sake of comparison. One main difference between the data I 
utilized and the data Bradbury utilized was that he adjusted the revenue estimates by 
subtracting out a constant value for national television revenue that is given to each team 
in the league. The reasoning for this is sound, as if this value was included in the revenue 
estimates, players’ MRP calculations would wind up being artificially high, as this 
national revenue is awarded to every team regardless of their performance, and thus 
individual player contributions have no effect on this revenue stream. However, there is a 
problem with how Bradbury accounts for this value. To find a national revenue estimate 
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Bradbury finds a 2007 value for national revenue and applies that to every team over the 
life of his data set. As Figure A-2 demonstrates, however, this is not the best way to 
estimate national revenues, because MLB revenues have been increasing significantly 
over time, and a lot of that growth is reflected in growing national television contracts. In 
other words, the national revenue a team received in 2005 would not necessarily be 
consistent with national revenue a team received in 2002.  
There were a few ways to account for this difference in national revenue by year. 
The first idea I had was to adjust national revenue by year-over-year growth rates of 
MLB league revenues so that the estimates reacted more consistently with how it truly 
moved. While this method would have been more accurate than the Bradbury method, it 
was still a crude estimate, as other factors besides national television contracts could be 
responsible for MLB league revenue growth. For this reason, I decided to simply add 
dummy variables for every year in the study. By adding these time effects, several 
different factors across years could be captured, whether that be varying disbursements of 
TV contracts or other nonobvious changes that caused revenue to fluctuate from year to 
year. Because national television revenue is simply a lump sum value allotted to every 
team, adding dummy variables for year should allow unadjusted Forbes revenue 
estimates to be utilized without being affected. 
Much like in Bradbury’s model, it was decided that population and honeymoon 
values would be gathered to test in the model. The population values were gathered from 
US Census data for the metropolitan area of the team. For years where Census data was 
not reported, the values were interpolated between the two nearest end points. Ballpark 
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age data was gathered from Baseball Reference, with eight years once again being the 
cutoff for the honeymoon dummy variable. Finally, I decided to gather data on Fan Cost 
Index as reported by Team Marketing Report. This index is a value in United States 
dollars which represents the cost of two adult average priced tickets, two children priced 
average tickets, four small soft drinks, two small beers, four hot dogs, two programs, 
parking, and two adult-sized caps. While obviously not every fan goes to a ballpark and 
purchases all of this, the FCI is supposed to represent the average cost for a family to 
attend a game at a given ballpark. It was intuitive that this value would correlate strongly 
to total revenue, and as Figure A-3 shows, when FCI was plotted with total revenue it 
showed a strong positive relationship with a correlation of 75%. With this being the case, 
it was useful to include FCI.  
With the addition of FCI, the data required to build a revenue projection model 
was compiled, and a regression analysis that was very similar to the one explained in J.C. 
Bradbury’s book could be performed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Player Value Model Results 
With the data compiled, the next step was to fit a model that could serve as a 
reliable predictor of player MRP based off of individual results. Table B-1 shows a 
description of the variables discussed in the previous section that would be used and 
Table B-2 displays the summary statistics. The first models I attempted were to run the 
same exact regressions as Bradbury does in his book, with and without FCI and yearly 
dummy variables included in the model. Much like when Bradbury created his model, the 
regression analysis performed here would be estimates of panel data, or, “data of a cross-
section of units over multiple observations” (Bradbury 2010). Additionally, much like 
when Bradbury ran his model, the unadjusted pooled regression would face the problems 
of heteroskedasticity and first order serial correlation. The heteroskedasticity meant that 
there was unequal variability of the residual values across all predicted values and the 
first order serial correlation meant that current estimates were affected by the previous 
estimate, resulting in error terms that were correlated over time. While this did not affect 
the bias of the estimators in the model, it did affect the efficiency of them, resulting in 
estimates of confidence intervals and t-statistics that were unreliable. To correct for this, 
a Newey-West correction of the standard errors was used, much like how Bradbury 
corrects for this issue in his book.  
As models 1 and 2 in Table B-3 demonstrates when the regression model that 
Bradbury settled on both with and without the inclusion of the FCI and yearly dummy 
variables were run, the cube of run differential variable was statistically insignificant both 
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times. To investigate why this was occurring, I decided to plot the relationship of total 
revenue and run differential in Figure A-4 similar to what Bradbury does in his book. As 
this image shows, the relationship between total revenue and run differential clearly is not 
linear, much like what Bradbury found. That said, the area of this graph in which the 
relevant data lies does not provide significant evidence that the relationship must be 
cubic. While a cubic graph and a quadratic graph have very distinguishing features when 
fully drawn out, the area of the curve where the data points in this study lie only show a 
convex relationship, without any clear inflection points, which is a characteristic of both 
graphs. For that reason, run differential and total revenue was treated as a quadratic to see 
if that relationship better fit the data.  
Model 3 and model 4 in Table B-3 shows the same models as 1 and 2, with the 
relationship of run differential and total revenue being a quadratic rather than a cubic. In 
both models, the square of run differential was significant, and there was a stark 
difference in adjusted R2 when FCI and yearly dummy variables were added to the 
equation meaning model 4 explained more of the variability in total revenue as explained 
by the independent variables than did model 3. Also, as shown in the previous chapter, 
FCI had a strong linear relationship with total revenue, and it made sense that it should be 
included in the model, while the discussion on national television revenue explains the 
usefulness of adding yearly dummy variables. Given these reasons, model 4 appeared to 
fit the data the best over the alternatives. While other models could have been tested 
including interaction variables or fixed- and random-effect estimators for teams, 
Bradbury sheds light on the decision to not move forward with these models in his book. 
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As he explains, his interaction models were all highly insignificant. Along with this, his 
reasoning to not move forward with random- and fixed-effects models was that “the 
known characteristics of teams includes their propensity to win” (Bradbury 2010). In 
other words, random- and fixed-effect methods, “attribute a large part of a team’s unique 
characteristics to revenue generation, which leads to a near-equal apportionment of 
revenue to all players” (Bradbury 2010). This obviously is not the goal of this model, as 
based off of real MLB salaries we can confirm that is not how the pay structure in the 
league actually works. For this reason, I decided to omit these types of procedures, and 
settled on the model 4 as my MRP projection model for this study. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Previous Draft Analysis and Theoretical Hypothesis 
With a model set in place for valuing players’ MRP, the focus could be shifted to 
answering the main question of this study, as to whether or not there is an optimal 
strategy to pursue in the MLB Rule IV Draft. Some economists and baseball analysts 
have done some research into this field, and have offered fairly consistent results. The 
first study I referenced was a 2006 article on Baseball Prospectus’ website written by 
Rany Jazayerli. In Jazayerli’s study, he looks at wins above replacement player values for 
MLB draft picks. Wins above replacement player is a metric created by sabermatricians 
that accounts for every statistic a player attributes to his team and assigns that player an 
amount of wins he contributed to his team over a replacement player, or a player who 
could be acquired for the league minimum. Jazayerli looks at discounted values of 15-
year wins above replacement level player for draft picks, and separates groups by high 
school, college, and junior college players. He then finds an expected value of discounted 
wins based on pick number that a player should have hypothetically generated over their 
career. He then subtracts the expected value a player would have generated based off of 
his pick number and the actual discounted value he produced to calculate a difference as 
well as a margin of return based off of actual wins above replacement over expected wins 
above replacement. While he does not separate by position, he concludes that on average 
in the time period of 1992-1999, “college draft picks yielded approximately 25% more 
value than high school players” (Jazayerli 2006). 
	   18	  
A follow up study was performed in 2009 by Victor Wang, now a member of the 
Cleveland Indians front office. In his study, he finds players’ wins above replacement per 
year for each player’s cost controlled six year window, and breaks the groups up by high 
school and college as well as hitters and pitchers. He then looks at different rounds the 
players were selected in, breaking them up by first round, supplemental and second round 
picks, and third round picks. The results that he finds, are that in the first round, college 
players have a slight edge over high school players, and hitters have an advantage over 
pitchers. He finds, however, that college players lose their advantage after the first round 
as do hitters over pitchers in the years 1990-1997. He concludes with an optimal strategy 
of, “hitters first, pitchers next” (Wang 2009). This strategy is fairly consistent with Bill 
James’ 1984 findings that college players produced more value than high school draftees, 
and that position players provided more value than pitchers. Finally, General Manager of 
the Oakland Athletics, Billy Beane has been noted to be of the opinion that high school 
players are overvalued compared to college players, and thus college players provide 
more return. 
In summation, most previous research on this topic leads to consistent viewpoints 
that there is an optimal drafting strategy, and that is to place preference on college hitters 
in the draft, especially in the first round. While it is possible that this strategy may hold 
true, there are some important factors some of this previous research has left out, that 
may lead to a different result. The first, is that these studies have not taken into account 
the cost of acquisition of a player. In the MLB Draft, all signing bonuses are not created 
equal. Some players command high bonuses, and some require being offered MLB 
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contracts before they agree to join an organization. For example, in the 2001 draft, Mark 
Teixeira was selected 5th overall out of Georgia Tech. In order to get him to sign with the 
Texas Rangers, the club had to offer him a four year contract worth $9.5 million in 
addition to his $2.5 million signing bonus before he ever stepped foot on a field. This cost 
of acquisition is incredibly high over a player who could be obtained at the end of the 
round such as Mike Fontenot who signed on board with the Cubs for a $1.4 million 
signing bonus at pick number 19 in the same draft. So, while Teixeira may have produced 
better numbers, and thus a higher wins above replacement over the early years of his 
career, did he produce significantly more than Fontenot to justify the much higher cost of 
acquisition? In addition, these studies do not take into account the lost expenses on 
players who do not make the major leagues, accounting for their loss from signing bonus 
as well as their minor league salaries while they tried to make it to the big leagues. In 
other words, these studies do not account for the variability between players of different 
age and positions. To see that a certain group produces higher average production is 
useful, but it does not tell the whole story, as it does not necessarily confirm that that 
group actually provides more return on investment. 
If players are being drafted efficiently, and signing bonuses are a fair proportional 
representation of future production on average, economic theory would suggest that there 
should be no optimal drafting strategy or exploitation of the market, but rather a necessity 
for good scouting and decision making by pick. Theoretically, there should be no 
difference in return on pitchers or hitters, or college or high school players, as what they 
get paid to sign and in ensuing salary should be a reflection on what they will produce in 
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the future. In other words, if on average, hitters do actually perform better than pitchers, 
they should require a higher cost of acquisition to align them with this production. Thus, 
their return on investment, measured by their MRP subtracted by their compensation, 
should fall in line with their pitcher counterparts who would see a lower cost of 
acquisition for lower expected production. While MLB rules would make it reasonable to 
assume the top players on average provide a positive return over their MRP’s until they 
reach a service time of salary adjustment, the returns should be consistent amongst 
positions and age. These papers have touched on this topic, however none of them have 
truly assigned monetary value to production versus acquisition, and it is my hypothesis 
that when this procedure is done, it will shed light on the fact that there truly is no 
exploitable strategy in the Rule IV Draft.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
Performance Metrics and Methodology 
With the expectations of results set, it was important to decide on performance 
metrics to plug into the model built in Chapter 4 to test this paper’s hypothesis. The first 
place I turned to for this was Bradbury’s book. While the model built for this paper has 
some slight differences to Bradbury’s, the general methodology was consistent, so it was 
useful to revisit Bradbury’s analysis and determine how he utilized his model to evaluate 
a player’s marginal revenue product. Bradbury decides to use “park-adjusted linear 
weights and plus/minus estimates of run contributions for each player” (Bradbury 2010). 
In other words, he finds estimates of the amount of runs players generated on offense and 
defense. He then compares this value to an average player in Major League Baseball. He 
multiplies this runs above average number to the weights found in his model for run 
differential, so that that number multiplies by the weight for run differential, the total runs 
above average squared multiplies by the weight for the square of run differential, and 
cubed runs above average multiplies by the weight for run differential cubes. This value 
provides Bradbury with a sum of the value above an average player that can be factored 
into a player’s MRP calculation. Once he has this result, he must determine what an 
average player’s value would be so that he can add this to the number he just found to 
calculate a player’s total value. Bradbury uses the intercept of his model as the total 
revenue an average team would expect to generate, and thus he develops a formula to 
divide this intercept up for both offensive and defensive contributions. By using the ratio 
of plate appearances a player makes of the entire team’s plate appearances, and positional 
	   22	  
adjustments for defense, Bradbury calculates the value of an average player with the 
same playing time as the player being studied. He then adds the player’s value above 
average calculation to the value of an average player and finds the total MRP of the 
player.  
For pitchers, Bradbury uses a slightly different approach. He creates a model 
using players’ defensive independent pitching statistics and estimates the expected runs 
they would allow based on strikeouts, walks, and home runs. He adjusts this value to 
account for home park influence. He does this at the team level, so to calculate a player’s 
MRP, he simply multiplies the percentage of batters faced by a pitcher in relation to the 
total batters faced by the team to the value he finds in his total runs prevented model. He 
once again uses a fraction of the intercept to account for the value of an average pitcher 
who pitched the same amount of innings as the pitcher being studied. When this average 
value is added to the value above averaged, he arrives at an unadjusted MRP for pitchers. 
The final adjustment Bradbury makes for pitchers is to account for the amount of innings 
pitched from the 7th as he finds runs allowed in these innings influence winning 
probability more. When this adjustment is made, he has his final estimate for pitcher 
MRP. 
I found Bradbury’s method to be interesting, and understandable, however, I was 
not convinced that using runs above average was necessarily the best way to move 
forward with my model. Bradbury does not simply plug a runs created value into his 
model to estimate a player’s MRP, because given the context of baseball, if a player did 
not play, someone would take his spot both on the 25 man roster as well as his playing 
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time. This substitute player can be thought of as the 26th man on the team, or the first 
replacement not currently on the MLB roster. Thus, in order to calculate a player’s MRP, 
the added runs that player produces over what his substitute would produce in the same 
positions and playing time is that player’s true run contribution rather than just the sum of 
his total runs. Of course, it is possible should a player not be on a team, a player currently 
on the bench would take his playing time, but for the sake of analysis assume all bench 
players are of about equal quality as this 26th man, so the substitute level of play would 
be the same whether it is someone who would be a bench player or off the team entirely. 
The Bradbury method suggests that this roster spot and playing time would be filled by 
an average Major League Baseball player who would otherwise be on the bench or in the 
minor leagues. The problem with this assumption is that an average player in Major 
League Baseball is usually not a readily available substitute. If average players were 
easily accessible, it would be the assumption that every MLB team should finish with as 
many wins as loses or better. This is obviously not the case, and thus, leads to the more 
realistic thought that non-starters in the major leagues are typically below average 
players.  
As explained earlier in the previous chapter, a replacement player in sabermetric 
research is considered a player who can be acquired for virtually no cost, or in this 
instance, the league minimum salary. This can include below average veteran players, or 
minor league players. The definition of a replacement player in sabermetrics states that a 
team full of replacement players would have a winning percentage of .294, down from 
the expected winning percentage of .500 that a team full of average players would be able 
	   24	  
to achieve. While it is likely that some teams may have substitutes available who are 
better players than theoretical replacement level, it is more reasonable to assume that 
teams’ bench and high minor league level players are closer to replacement quality than 
the average level assumed by Bradbury. Because of this, a similar approach could be used 
in my model as Bradbury’s, however, a runs above replacement metric would be a more 
accurate representation of a player’s MRP than runs above average, and thus, that is what 
I decided to use for this study.  
Much like in Bradbury’s method, I had to find a quantifiable value for the total 
runs produced by a player. The metric I referenced for this value was Bill James’ total 
runs created metric. Total runs created is a value reported by Bill James ever year that 
produces a value that a player contributes to his team summing up offensive and 
defensive runs. This is a counting statistic and is not scaled to zero for league average or 
replacement players. For offensive runs, James uses a metric called runs created. James’ 
runs created is a statistic that measures a hitter’s value to his team based off of his ability 
to score runs. In its simplest form, runs created is measured by hits plus walks, multiplied 
by total bases. This total is divided by at bats plus walks. Since the metric was invented 
in the 1970’s, however, it has gone through many technical changes, and is now a lot 
more advanced than the simple formula it started as. Rather than using James’ runs 
created formula, I decided I would use Fangraphs weighted runs created (wRC), which 
“is an improved version of Bill James’ Runs Created (RC) statistic which is based off 
Weighted On-Base Average (wOBA),”  (Fangraphs 2015) developed by Tom Tango. The 
formula for weighted runs created is: 
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wRC = ((wOBA-League wOBA/wOBA Scale) + (League Runs/Plate 
Appearances))* Plate Appearances 
 To understand wRC, it is essential to understand wOBA. Weighted On-Base 
Average is grounded on the concept that “not all hits are created equal” (Fangraphs 
2014). The classic metric of on-base percentage weights every trip on base the same, 
whether that be a single or a home run. Slugging percentage adjust this slightly, adding 
weights to hits, but it is not accurate as research has shown a double is not truly worth 
twice as much as a single. This new metric of wOBA “combines all different aspects of 
hitting into one metric, weighting each of them in proportion to their actual run value” 
(Fangraphs 2014). In other words, this metric more accurately measures what each trip on 
base does for a player’s total production to offense using linear weights. There is a strong 
relationship between wRC and Bill James’ runs created, so either of these metrics could 
have been utilized and would have produced very similar results, however, the technical 
adjustments from wOBA that produce the wRC led me to believe that wRC would be a 
slightly more accurate representation of a player’s offensive runs created.  
 With wRC settled on as an offensive metric, I then had to decide on how to value 
a player’s contribution on defense and on the base paths.  For this, I once again turned to 
Bill James. In James’ total runs created calculation, he uses John Dewan’s defensive runs 
saved (DRS) from his Fielding Bible books. Defensive runs saved utilizes film study and 
computer comparisons to calculate how players make plays in the field relative to the 
league average. As Joe Posnanski of Sports Illustrated explains, “if a shortstop makes a 
play that only 24% of shortstops make, he will get .76 of a point. If a shortstop blows a 
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play that 82% of shortstops make, then you subtract .82 of a point” (Fangraphs 2014).  
The total value of runs saved takes into account stolen bases saved by pitchers and 
catchers, double plays turned by middle infielders, bunts saved by corner infielders, and 
outfielders’ ability to prevent runners from advancing extra bases. When everything is 
added together, a counting metric is produced to represent runs saved above an average 
fielder. The total runs created value, however, was not supposed to be a comparison to 
average players, but rather a counting metric from zero. To adjust for this, Dewan also 
adds in a positional adjustment, which accounts for the difference in difficulty and 
importance of defense in certain positions such as shortstop and catcher. Table B-4 
reports the positional adjustments used, and they are reflections of playing a full season, 
or nine innings in every one of the 162 games of a MLB season at a position. To measure 
a player’s positional adjustment, I simply found the ratio of innings they played at a 
position relative to a full season of innings and multiplied it by the respective adjustment. 
All of the positions were added up to get a total positional adjustment. This adjustment 
serves two purposes. First, it allows players across positions to be compared. Average 
defense at shortstop is worth more to a team’s chances of winning than average play at 
first base, as shortstop is the more difficult defensive position. Additionally, it levels the 
playing field slightly for players who produce less offensively, but play great defense at 
those important positions over players who just go out and hit homeruns at positions like 
designated hitter. Along with this, adding a positional adjustment builds in the value 
produced by an average defender. If a player has zero runs saved, they are still credited 
for providing that average value by receiving their adjustment based off their innings 
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played, which is a similar concept to what Bradbury uses in his analysis to calculate 
average defensive value.  
 With hitting and defense squared away, the next metric added into a total runs 
calculation is base running. For this value, I used the what Bill James uses in his total 
runs created calculation, which is to add a quantifiable value for base running plays such 
as steals, advancing to extra bases on base hits, and tagging up on fly balls to name a few. 
The metric utilized for this paper was reported on Fangraphs as base running (BsR), and 
this value was consistent with that utilized by James.  
 When values for offensive runs created, defensive runs saved, base running runs, 
and a positional adjustment were added together, a total runs calculation could be made 
for position players. This value is the sum of all of the runs a player added to his team’s 
total during his season of play. Before any analysis could be carried out, however, it was 
necessary to create a metric for pitchers that would utilize the same scale as hitters. For 
this, I referenced a 2006 article by David Gassko titled, “Pitching Runs Created.” This 
article devises a method in which a pitcher’s production in run prevention can be 
converted to what a team would have to produce offensively to match that production. To 
devise this method, Gassko calls on what is called the Pythagorean Theorem of Baseball, 
also an invention of Bill James which defines expected winning percentage to be a 
function of the square of runs scored divided by the square of runs scored plus the square 
of runs allowed. Gassko uses this formula to explain that a pitcher “who allows one run a 
game is exactly as valuable as a lineup that scores 15.4” (Gassko 2006). The procedure to 
convert these runs allowed to runs scored involves finding a player’s runs allowed 
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average. This value is essentially the same as the classic earned run average, except it 
also takes into account unearned runs. Next, the league average for runs per game is 
found, whether it be the AL or the NL, and added to the runs allowed average of the 
pitcher to create a run environment. This run environment is raised to the .287 power, to 
create a custom exponent to use in the Pythagorean formula. The average runs per game 
of the league and the runs allowed average of the pitcher are plugged into the 
Pythagorean formula to produce a pitcher’s custom winning percentage. The average runs 
per game is then switched from runs scored to runs allowed in the formula, to find how 
many runs a team would need to score to match that winning percentage in the run 
environment defined. This value is then multiplied by the innings a pitcher pitched in the 
season and divided by nine. Finally, Gassko uses an adjustment for defense. He finds that 
pitchers who have higher strikeout rates should be given a bigger share of the defensive 
credit for a team, and thus he multiplies his pitching runs created value by a percentage of 
credit the pitcher should receive based off of their strikeout rate, that he has calculated 
through empirical data. The value calculated after this is a pitching runs created value 
that is on a consistent scale as offensive runs created. 
 I decided to replicate Gassko’s procedure, with a few alterations. The first, was 
that I felt a more accurate metric could be used than runs allowed average. Additionally, I 
felt if a more accurate metric could be utilized, the adjustment made for strikeout rate 
would be unnecessary. The metric I ultimately decided to use was skill interactive earned 
run average (SIERA), developed by Matt Swartz and Eric Seidman of Baseball 
Prospectus in 2010. This metric is an ERA estimator, and is thus on the same scale as that 
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classic statistic. SIERA is used to evaluate what the overall skill level of a pitcher is, 
giving higher credit to strikeouts, which is consistent with Gassko’s findings, and makes 
adjustments for a pitcher’s ground ball and fly ball rates, home ballparks, and run 
environments. Much like other metrics such as fielding independent pitching (FIP), 
SIERA represents a value of what a pitcher did individually, and does not account for the 
defense behind him. Thus, SIERA could be used in replacement of runs allowed average, 
as it is a more accurate picture of a pitcher’s skill level, and there is no need to adjust the 
initial pitching runs created value by anything, as SIERA already accounts for the added 
skills Gassko talks about. This method of calculating pitching runs created is similar to 
Bill James’ in his total runs created report, however, he uses component ERA rather than 
SIERA. While this is essentially a choice of personal preference, SIERA has performed 
well as an ERA predictor since its inception, and I felt it would be the most accurate 
representation of a pitcher’s talent. 
 With pitching runs created now added, to find the total runs created for a pitcher, 
the only steps remaining were to add in offensive runs created, base running, defense, and 
positional adjustment, much like with their position player counterparts. Once this was 
completed, a consistent input variable was created for both pitchers and hitters that would 
make them easily comparable for the draft analysis.  
 With total runs created calculated for both hitters and pitchers, it was essential to 
find a way to estimate a replacement player’s total runs created for each player to 
compare to much like how Bradbury devises a method to find an average player’s value. 
To do this, I once again utilized the Pythagorean Theorem of Baseball. As stated 
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previously, sabermetric research has defined a team full of replacement players to be a 
team that would have a .294 win percentage over a full season. Given that definition, I 
found the value of a replacement’s total offensive runs created for a particular position 
player by plugging the .294 win percentage into the Pythagorean formula to generate a 
value for the total runs a team full of replacement hitters would score based off the 
amount of runs that player’s team allowed over the course of the season. I then found the 
total number of plate appearances that player’s team had over the course of the year, and 
multiplied the total runs scored for the replacement team by the ratio of plate appearances 
the player took as a reflection of his team’s total plate appearances. This represented the 
offensive runs a replacement player would generate on the same team as the player in 
question given the same playing time. To find the defensive runs a replacement player 
would generate, I assumed they would save no defensive runs, and thus would be an 
average fielder. I added the same positional adjustment as the player in question to the 
replacement player’s offensive runs, and this provided me with a total runs created value 
for the replacement player playing the same amount of time as the player being 
evaluated. Given this value, I could subtract a hitter’s total runs created value by their 
replacement player’s total runs created value to find their runs produced above the 
replacement.  
 For pitchers, a much easier method could be used to find a replacement player’s 
total runs created. All that had to be done in this instance was to follow the same 
procedure used to calculate pitcher’s runs created, however, rather than using the 
calculated win percentage of the pitcher from their SIERA, the win percentage used in 
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the Pythagorean formula was the replacement team win percentage of .294. This formula 
then produced a replacement runs per game, and multiplying this value by the pitcher in 
question’s innings pitched and dividing by nine produced a replacement pitcher’s 
pitching runs created given the same amount of playing time on the same team. Finally, 
the positional adjustment was added to this value to calculate the replacement pitchers 
total runs created. Once again, the total runs created of the pitcher being studied could be 
subtracted by the replacement pitcher’s total runs created to find the pitcher’s runs 
created above replacement.  
 With every player now having a value for runs above replacement as well as a 
total runs created for their personal replacement player, the MRP model could be utilized 
to evaluate a player’s value for that season. To do this, the player’s runs above 
replacement was plugged into the equation to find the player’s value above replacement 
added to the team due to their performance rather than the replacement player who would 
take their playing time if they did not play. To find the player’s total value, then, the 
replacement runs created was plugged into the model to find the value that the 
replacement player would be worth given the same playing time. The value above 
replacement could be added to the value of a replacement player to calculate the total 
MRP of a player. This is a nearly identical procedure Bradbury takes to calculate MRP, 
with the utilization of a replacement player rather than an average player. 
 I did consider adjusting MRP calculations based off of the run differential for 
team in which the player was a member of, I ultimately decided to not do this. The theory 
behind this adjustment follows with the idea that wins produce more revenue the better 
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the team is. This is seen by the nonlinear relationship of run differential and total 
revenue. Thus, a player who produces equal amounts of runs on a good team as someone 
on a bad team, would generate more revenue than the player on a bad team. This 
adjustment would be very useful in determining what a particular team would be willing 
to pay to acquire a player in free agency, and could provide more accurate measures of 
what a player’s value truly was in a given year. However, in the context of MLB Draft 
analysis making this adjustment could alter the true results of the question at hand. If 
traditionally good teams follow a consistent drafting strategy that differs from a bad team, 
a clear difference amongst position or age would be evident even if the players were 
providing equal production. It could be argued that the drafting strategies are the reason 
these teams are better, however, that would be ignoring several important factors such as 
quality free agent additions and trades that are added to drafted players to fill out a roster. 
Thus, for the sake of this analysis, the best bet was to consider all of these drafted players 
playing on otherwise average teams. 
The question still remained, however, as to whether or not the method explained 
in this chapter would provide estimates consistent with MRP, much like Bradbury’s 
model had. To test this, I decided to use my model to create MRP estimates and compare 
them with MLB player salaries. To do this, however, specific types of players had to be 
chosen. Initially, my idea was to compare the MRP model with a random collection of 
players and see how it correlated with salary. This, however, is not necessarily the best 
way to test the model. The biggest reason for this is multi-year contracts in Major League 
Baseball. Player production usually sees some fluctuation from year to year. Some 
	   33	  
seasons, players have career years and breakout performances, and thus, their production 
exceeds their salary, while other years, players can get hurt or underachieve and not live 
up to expectations. A proposed solution to this, then would be to evaluate free agent 
contracts in regards to previous performance. Once again, however, this is not a great 
way to test the model. As discussed in earlier parts of this paper, free agency is not 
necessarily a great indicator of MRP for various reasons. One large one, again, is due to 
multi-year deals. When a player signs a contract over a number of years, a MLB team 
does not simply take their marginal revenue product, and multiply that over the life of the 
contract to arrive at a total value. They must project out a player’s performance over the 
life of the deal, and often times, that results in deals that are smaller than if a player had 
signed a one-year deal every season over the same time period. Why then do players sign 
multi-year contracts? The answer to this is for security. MLB contracts are fully 
guaranteed, and when a player signs a long-term deal, they are guaranteed payment no 
matter what happens to their health or production level. Teams know this, and this also 
will cause them to offer less than a player’s current MRP multiplied over the length of the 
contract. For this reason, free agent contracts are a potentially unstable measure of a 
player’s true worth.  
The best bet to compare my model to a player’s real MRP value, then, was to look 
at player’s who had signed one-year contracts. A one-year deal is the closest we can get 
to a player receiving what his actual MRP is in baseball. In theory, when a team agrees to 
terms with a player on a one-year basis, they are paying him exactly what their 
expectation is based off of past performance as to what he will produce on the field. As 
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with all free agent deals, this can be slightly skewed, as players at the end of their careers 
could be willing to accept less than their worth to chase a championship, or player’s can 
take a home town discount. That said, evaluating one-year deals to MRP projections 
should provide some insight to the power of the model. As Table B-5 shows, I evaluated 
the five highest hitter and pitcher deals agreed upon in the 2015 offseason. For the inputs 
to calculate a total runs created value, I used Fangraphs Steamer projections for 2015 
numbers, as well as weighted averages of the last three seasons for any values not present 
in their projection system. To find replacement values, I used the total at bats and runs 
allowed of the team the player was joining from the previous season. As the results show, 
the model was about $1.7 million off from the real contract on average. Additionally, in 
Table B-6 I calculated salary projections using the same model with just raw total runs 
created as the input rather than the adjustment made for replacement. Finally, in Table B-
7 I mirrored the procedure I used to calculate MRP with replacements, however, I set the 
values to now account for average players. This is not the exact procedure that Bradbury 
takes, but it is the same in theory. As the tables show, the MRP calculation when 
replacement players were used performed the best across the board, which is what I had 
anticipated. While there was some error in the projections, this is certainly to be 
expected, as projection systems are merely educated guesses, and there could be other 
factors at play effecting agreed upon deals. That said, I felt that an error under $2 million 
was sufficient to conclude that total runs created above replacement would serve as an 
effective performance metric to use in the model. 
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Finally, with the model created and the performance metrics devised, it was time 
to develop the methodology to evaluate the MLB Rule IV Draft. The first decision I had 
to make was what players to use and from what time period. I decided to use the picks 
that were selected in the top 100 picks of the draft that had agreed to sign contracts over 
the 10-year time period of 2000-2009. Any years after 2009 would likely have not been 
that relevant, as many players would not have reached the big leagues yet. I accounted for 
the player’s drafted position, whether they were drafted out of high school or college, and 
their inflation adjusted signing bonus. For positions, I grouped them into infielders, 
outfielders, catchers, or pitchers. I did not separate by infield or outfield position as many 
players were drafted without specific positions.  
The next big factor to decide was how many years of a player’s career I wanted to 
utilize. In Major League Baseball, a player has no negotiating power in his annual salary 
until he reaches three years of service time. At this point, a player is eligible to have a 
hearing in front of a salary arbitrator where both the player and the team submit salary 
offers, and the arbitrator selects the player’s salary based off the cases made by both 
teams.  Some players who have significant playing time in their first two years, known as 
“Super Two” players reach this status early. Arbitration is the first time, salaries are 
aligned with performance in a player’s career, although they are still less than what the 
player would find in the open market. After six years of service, a player can become a 
free agent, and thus, can sign with any team on the free agent market. Some draft analysis 
papers have looked at a player’s pre-arbitration years while others have looked at the full 
six seasons. In this study, I decided to only look at the years of pre-arbitration. One 
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reason for this, is simply that not every player ever gets to arbitration. In fact, most 
players are signed to extensions that buy out the player’s arbitration years for the team. 
To evaluate a player’s return over their salary during an arbitration extension, would be 
adding into account how well teams execute strategies, their foresight for player 
progression, and negotiating skills. The goal of this paper is to evaluate the draft, and the 
arbitration process begins to add outside noise to the analysis. Additionally, some smaller 
market teams find when players get to arbitration they become too expensive and they 
feel the need to trade or release them. On the other hand, pre-arbitration players are 
almost never moved due to salary, and thus, in theory, a team who drafts a player is 
essentially guaranteed a player’s pre-arbitration efforts if they want them. For these 
reasons, pre-arbitration years made the most sense for this analysis. 
While the first season of arbitration served as a cutoff for players who made the 
majors, I could carry out the analysis of a player’s total return on investment. To do this, I 
found a player’s salary value for each year up until their first year of arbitration. For 
salary data that was unavailable, I used the league minimum based off the season in 
question reported by Statista. I then calculated the player’s total runs created above 
replacement for each season and plugged that into the MRP estimation model. I added 
this value to the value of the player’s replacement to find the player’s total MRP. I then 
subtracted their salary from their MRP to calculate a return. I summed up their return 
over each season to arrive at a total return on investment. For the first season a player was 
drafted, I added their signing bonus to their salary, and utilizing a 2014 ESPN article that 
revealed that minor leaguers typically make anywhere from $3,000-$11,000 a year, I 
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decided then, for every season a player played in the minors, I would assign them a salary 
value of $5,000. This study included both players who made it to the majors as well as 
players who never did. With the methodology and metrics in place, I could evaluate the 
draft picks to look for any potential trends in the data. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Discussion and Results 
 Once the database of players was built, the distribution of top 
performances by position was analyzed. Table B-8 lists the top performances in terms of 
dollar worth of all the players included in the study in addition to their runs above 
replacement and total replacement runs. The distribution of hitters to pitchers was 35-15. 
By fielder position, infielders held 16 of the top 50 scores each, outfielders had 13 and 
catcher had six. This distribution was compared to the distribution of the top 50 MLB 
salaries for the 2015 season as reported in Table B-9 from Spotrac. This shows that 30 of 
the top 50 highest paid players in baseball are hitters, with 20 being pitchers. By position, 
pitchers lead the pack with 20, infielders with 17, outfielders with 11, and catchers with 
two. The two distributions are very similar, and further sheds light on the fact that the 
runs above replacement method is predicting reasonably. While hitters appear to 
dominate the distribution of top seasons, they also dominate the distribution of top 
salaries. 
 Table B-9 shows the top 50 returns on investment in the study. The distribution, 
as expected, comes much closer to an even split, with hitters accounting for 27 of the top 
50 and pitchers accounting for 23. Figure A-5 shows the trend of mean returns between 
hitters and pitchers by Draft year over time, and Figure A-6 shows the same with hitter 
positions broken down specifically. Finally, Figure A-7 shows how the mean of returns 
has varied over time broken up by high school and college players. While these visuals 
depict some interesting information, they do not reveal anything conclusive.  
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While the mean of return on investment provides some useful information, it is 
not the only metric that can be analyzed to reveal the true relationship between return on 
investment between position and age. The reason for this is demonstrated by Figure A-8, 
which is a depiction of the distribution of returns of all players in the study. As this image 
illustrates, the majority of returns fall right around zero. This is intuitive, as one would 
expect signing bonuses and salaries to be a reflection of future performance as explained 
previously in this paper. Therefore, if this compensation is efficiently given out, one 
would expect most players to produce exactly at the level they are paid. Therefore, the 
majority of players will provide a return on investment right around zero, with quite a 
large amount of players who never make the MLB providing negative values, and some 
who become legitimate contributors to provide positive values. If this was not the case, 
players would likely lobby for higher signing bonuses and salaries if returns were 
typically much higher than zero, and the MLB team owners would argue for lower 
compensation if the reverse were true. That said, as illustrated by this image, there is still 
a portion of this distribution that moves to the far right of zero, with returns reaching as 
high as $60,000,000. It is the goal of all teams to draft as many players who fall in this 
area of the curve while drafting as few as possible who fall to the left of zero. Given the 
shape of the distribution, it is clear that while the mean has value in reaching conclusions, 
it is not the only metric that can be looked at, as this value is clearly being pulled to the 
right by the extreme values displayed. For that reason to compare returns between 
pitchers and position players as well as high school and college players, it must be the 
entire distribution that is compared rather than just an average. By comparing the entire 
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distribution, it can be statistically concluded whether or not, on average, the probability 
of selecting a player who provides positive or negative return is more likely given a 
certain group of players, and this will reveal the conclusions desired in this study. 
To test for difference in distributions, a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
was used. This test is a nonparametric test that evaluates against the null hypothesis that 
two independent sample distributions come from the same population. In other words, 
this test will take into the account the characteristics of the distributions and will provide 
a conclusion as to whether or not there is significant evidence of a difference in 
distributions between two samples, whether that difference be from central tendency, 
spread, or shape. This test, along with analyzing some summary data and visuals between 
to distributions should allow some significant conclusions to be drawn. 
The first group analyzed was position players and pitchers. Figure A-9 shows a 
plot of the approximate distributions of return on investment of these two groups. 
Visually analyzing this graph, it appears that pitchers have a higher probability of falling 
within a central point right around zero. It appears as though position players provide a 
slightly higher probability of falling to the right of the curve at returns around 
$20,000,000, with this phenomenon beginning to stop at the higher extremes. However, 
they also appear to have a higher probability of providing returns that are below zero than 
pitchers. To build off of this eye test, some numbers were brought into the analysis. Table 
B-11 displays the 25th percentile of the distribution, median return, 75th percentile of the 
distribution, interquartile range, maximum value, minimum value, and mean return on 
investment for both position players and pitchers. These numbers are consistent with the 
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analysis of the distribution curves. Both groups have similar slightly negative medians 
that lie right around zero. The position player group has a higher mean value, in addition 
to a higher value at the 75th percentile than pitchers. An interesting observation to note is 
that position players provided a higher maximum return, but also a lower minimum 
return, which is consistent with the observation from the distribution plots. When the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was run against the null hypothesis, there was insignificant 
evidence to conclude that returns of position players were different than pitchers. Taking 
all of the relevant information into account, it appears that position players provide a 
higher risk and higher reward than pitchers, but there is no clear exploitable strategy 
between the two. 
The next part of the analysis was to look at the difference between position 
players and pitchers selected in the first round. Figure A-10 displays the distribution of 
returns on investment between these groups of players. This distribution plot looks quite 
a bit different than the previous. Once again, pitchers appear to have a higher probability 
of falling within a return around zero than position players, however, in this graph, the 
difference in positive returns seems to be of much greater significance in the favor of 
position players. When analyzing the values provided in Table B-12, it can be seen that 
position players appeared to provide a higher mean and median return on investment than 
pitchers, with a higher value for the 75th percentile as well. For this group, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test provided significant evidence to conclude a difference in 
returns on investment between hitters and pitchers in the first round exists, in favor of the 
position players. This was an interesting result, and fell in line with some previous 
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research referenced in this paper, however, it did not follow economic theory. To 
investigate this further, I looked at disparities in median and mean return on investments 
in the first round by year. The most notable difference was demonstrated in 2005. When I 
looked further into the players selected in this year, I found that position players selected 
included Justin Upton, Alex Gordon, Ryan Zimmerman, Ryan Braun, Troy Tulowitzki, 
Andrew McCutchen, Jay Bruce, and Jacoby Ellsbury, all of who became very successful 
players. It was possible then, that 2005 was the outlier, and was creating a relationship 
that did not truly exist. To test this idea, I reran the summary statistics with the exclusion 
of the year 2005. As seen in Table B-13, the results appeared to be a lot more consistent 
between the two groups in this instance. When the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was run 
without 2005 included, the resulting test statistic was insignificant, leading one to 
question whether position players truly provide higher returns on investment in the first 
round. 
After analyzing the first round, the same procedure was done for rounds other 
than the first. Figure A-11 displays the results of these distributions, and by analyzing 
them with the naked eye, they look very similar. Table B-14 confirms the similarity in 
these distributions, as many of the values between the two groups are not very far apart. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test failed to provide significant evidence of a difference in 
return on investment between hitters and pitchers in rounds outside of the first, which is 
consistent with the expected result. 
Finally, the last positional tests that were of interest were by actual positions of 
the hitters. Figure A-6 shows the average return by year of these positions, and given the 
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large fluctuations by year, it is unlikely that any of these positions provide a significant 
advantage over the others consistently, however, the test was still run. Figure A-12 
displays the distributions of return on investment for catchers, infielders, and outfielders. 
It is clear from this visual that infielders and outfielders have very similar distributions, 
while the distribution of catchers appears to be more centrally located around zero than 
the other two. Table B-15 displays that each position recorded very similar median and 
mean returns. Catchers provided a lower maximum return as well as a higher minimum 
return than infielders and outfielders, also demonstrating a lower spread displayed by the 
IQR value. This could once again suggest catchers are less of a risk-reward pick than the 
other two positional groups. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was run for each of the three 
positional groups, and failed to show a significant difference between any two of them. 
This is logical, and falls in line with the expectations brought about by the visual and 
summary metrics. 
With the analysis of position providing very little conclusive evidence of a 
difference in return on investment, the focus could be shifted to the high school and 
college player groups. The overall distribution as seen in Figure A-13 shows a much 
higher percentage of returns falling right around zero for high school players, while 
college players appear to have a larger percentage of returns immediately to the right of 
zero than high schoolers, with the behavior at the right extremes appearing to be 
consistent. Table B-16 shows that while both groups the college players have a slightly 
higher mean than the high school players, as the 75th percentile is much higher for this 
group. This remains consistent with the visual, as it appears that college players provide 
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more consistent positive returns than do high school players. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test confirms this, as it shows significant evidence of a difference between returns of 
college and high school players. Given this result and the other information mentioned, it 
can be concluded that college players are the preferable selection over high school 
players overall. 
The result of the high school and college analysis found concluding evidence 
against my hypothesis, so this prompted me to look further. I decided to evaluate whether 
this relationship was consistent amongst all rounds, or if it could be explained by just the 
first. Figure A-14 shows the distribution of returns for first round players. This image is 
very telling, as it appears high school players not only have a higher probability of 
landing around zero, but also have a higher probability of providing a negative return on 
investment. The right side of the image shows that college players are have a much 
higher proportion of positive returns relative to high school with the behavior at the 
extremes looking fairly similar. The statistics in Table B-17 show that college players 
have a much higher median return on investment, while the mean shows an advantage in 
the favor of college players as well. The maximum return for high school players is 
higher than that of college, but the minimum return is also lower, demonstrating the risk 
involved with selected such a player. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows results similar 
to the overall high school and college results, providing statistical evidence to conclude 
that there is a difference in returns between the two groups. It is clear, that college players 
are the more preferable selection overall in the first round. 
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This same analysis was carried out for rounds outside of the first to see if the 
results were consistent with the previous two. Figure A-15 displays the very peculiar 
graph of distributions between high school and college players in rounds outside of the 
first. It is hard to draw many conclusions from this graph, however, it appears that high 
school players have a larger proportion of returns around zero, and a lower proportion to 
the direct right of zero. Table B-18 shows that the medians and the means are fairly 
consistent, as are the minimum and maximum values. The major difference between 
these two groups appears to lie in the 75th percentile, where college players see a much 
higher value than their high school counterparts. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic 
was significant against the null hypothesis, and thus, it could be concluded that there is a 
difference in returns on investment in favor of college players across the entire MLB 
Draft. 
It looked clear that college players were providing more return on investment on 
average than high school players, however, I decided to try and evaluate this relationship 
by position to see if there was any position that was driving this relationship, or if college 
players seemed to be the best pick on average in the draft no matter what. The first 
position I evaluated was catcher. The distribution of returns can be seen in Figure A-16, 
and this image appears to show that high school catchers have a larger probability of 
falling around a return of zero with a lower probability of falling just to the right of that 
and just to the left of that than college catchers. The relationship as the returns on 
investment approach about $10,000,000 seem to show inconsistency between the two 
groups, and thus, it was hard to draw anything definitive from the image alone. The 
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values provided in Table B-19 show that the medians and means appear to be about the 
same, with the 75th percentile being higher for college players. The up and down 
movements of the distributions however make it hard to draw any conclusions without 
the use of a statistical test, and when the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was run, there was no 
significant evidence to conclude a difference between return on investment between 
college and high school catchers. 
Figure A-17 illustrates the distributions of college and high school infielders’ 
returns on investment. This graph appears to demonstrate a preference to the college 
player, as it provides higher probability of values above zero by what appears to be quite 
a bit. Table B-20 confirms this hunch, showing that college infielders have a much higher 
median return, mean return, maximum return, minimum return, and 75th percentile value. 
Finally, when the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was run, there was significant evidence to 
conclude that the distribution of college infielder returns on investment and high school 
infielder returns on investment was different, and it was clear that college infielders 
showed a significant advantage over the high school players. 
The next position evaluated was the outfielder position. The distribution of high 
school and college outfielders as seen in Figure A-18 appeared to show a very similar 
relationship to that of the infielders. Once again, it looked as though outfielders have a 
much higher proportion of players in the positive returns, with the only noticeable time 
the high schoolers taking an advantage being at the extreme points. When the summary 
statistics were analyzed in Table B-21, similar median and mean returns were reported 
between the two groups. However, the 75th percentile for college players was much 
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higher, which appears consistent with the image of the distributions. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test provided significant evidence to conclude there is a difference between high 
school and college outfielders in terms of their return on investment, and thus, the 
conclusion could be drawn that the college outfielder was the superior choice over the 
high school player on average. 
The final position to evaluate in the high school and college tests was pitchers. 
The image of the distributions of these two groups, seen in Figure A-19, appears to show 
similar curves. The high school pitchers appear to have a higher probability around zero, 
with a slightly lower probability to the returns around $10,000,000, however, other than 
that, the graphs look very similar. The mean and median values of return on investment 
reported in Table B-22 show very similar results, and there is no value that is glaringly 
obvious to suggest a difference in the distributions. When the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
was run, the test statistic was insignificant, and thus, it could not be concluded that there 
is a difference in returns between high school and college pitchers. 
Overall, the data showed no significant difference between pitchers and position 
players as a whole, with the only significant difference coming in the first round. 
However, when one particular draft was accounted for, this result also became 
insignificant. On the other hand, college players showed overall significance of higher 
returns on investment over high school players in all rounds of the draft. When broken 
down by position, this result was mirrored by infielders and outfielders, with catchers and 
pitchers failing to provide statistical evidence of a difference in return between high 
school and college players. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusions 
After performing the analysis on hitters against pitchers as well as high school 
players versus college players, there were a few interesting results to comment on. First 
off, I can conclude through this study, that there does not appear to be any exploitable 
strategy by position in the draft, whether that be hitter versus pitchers or by hitter 
position. While the first round results did show a significant difference in preference of 
hitters over pitchers, these results were explained strongly by one draft in particular, 
leading one to question whether that difference truly exists. This all falls in line with my 
expected outcome, and with economic theory, that suggests that signing bonuses and 
compensation should reflected expected performance, and thus, return on investment 
should not be different between hitters and pitchers if the draft operates efficiently. 
Based off of the distributions of return on investment between hitters and pitchers, 
it appears that pitchers provide a little more certainty in return, while hitters are more of a 
boom or bust group. There could be many reasons for this, but I believe the most likely 
explanation to the increased volatility in hitters’ return on investment as opposed to 
pitchers is that hitters’ skillsets are harder to project long-term. For example, if a pitching 
prospect throws a 94-mile per hour fastball, and has plus off speed pitches with good 
command, his skillset is very clear. While he may need further seasoning and 
development, one can project this pitcher’s ability to succeed in the long run based off of 
what he throws and how similar pitchers have faired in the MLB. Hitters on the other 
hand are harder to project. Metrics such as bat speed and strikeout rate, and physical size 
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are components that can help shape a hitter’s expectations, however, there is no 
guaranteed way to project how a hitter’s skills and stats will carry over to facing better 
pitching in the pro game. In baseball, the pitcher controls the game, as the ball starts in 
his hands. For that reason, you know what a pitcher can give you consistently based off 
of his skills, but a hitter’s performance depends on his ability to square up the ball that is 
thrown to him, which could vary as that pitching he faces improves. While the data 
shows when a team successfully drafts a hitter, it rewards them with a bigger return, that 
ability to draft one can be difficult, which would explain the higher probability of 
negative values over pitchers. 
The analysis of high school players against college players showed that college 
players provided higher returns during pre-arbitration years on average in the top 100 
picks, regardless of round selected. That said, when broken down by position only 
infielders and outfielders provided a significant difference in return between the two 
groups of players, while pitchers and catchers did not. While this does not follow 
economic theory, there are a few possible explanations for this. One explanation is that 
high school infielders and outfielders generate more off field revenue than college 
infielders and outfielders do. This is possible, as many times organizations try to sell a 
young prospect as the face of their future. This can draw more fans to minor league 
games to watch this young player and can raise merchandise sales when he finally does 
arrive to the MLB team. College players typically spend less time in the minor leagues, 
and thus they cannot build as much hype as their high school counterparts before joining 
the MLB club. If MLB teams feel they can sell a prospect as  “the next Derek Jeter,” it is 
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possible that they are willing to pay more to acquire an inferior talent, as other sources of 
revenue will cancel out the difference on the field, and in reality, high school infielders 
and outfielders do generate equal return to college infielders and outfielders.  
While this could be an explanation, if this was the case, it would be likely that the 
relationship between high school and college returns would be consistent amongst all the 
positions, not just the two mentioned. For that reason, it is also entirely possible that 
teams simply draft high school and college infielders and outfielders inefficiently. It is 
easy for teams to fall in love with a young prospect and believe that he will be the next 
Mike Trout, however, it is reasonable to assume that teams have a lot more information 
available with players who played college baseball than those coming out of high school. 
As mentioned before, offensive production can be hard to project, and this can become 
increasingly difficult when trying to measure a high school player’s skillset against local 
high school and summer league showcase pitching. A lot of high school hitters can 
appear as a big fish even if they are in a small pond, and that can increase teams’ 
viewpoints on this player. A college player usually has fully developed physically, and 
has played years against higher level talent, thus, more information is available as to how 
good that player actually is. With more available information, teams can select college 
players more efficiently than they can with high school players. For that reason, high 
school players provide more risk, even if they provide more reward for hitting the jackpot 
on a prospect. This risk should be reflected in the spot high school players get drafted as 
well as how much money they receive in compensation, however, it appears that this is 
not the case. With teams willing to pay equal or greater signing bonuses to high school 
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players, they make it clear that they are pursuing the extreme to the far right of the 
distribution without necessarily understanding the probability that they are making a bad 
investment. 
Additionally, given the rules of the MLB Draft, teams may be willing to assume 
risk on a high school player knowing that they will not get a chance to select that player 
for three years if they decide to attend a college program. With this being the case, teams 
know they may never have another chance to select this particular player, and may be 
willing to assume a loss with the potential of large upside that they may not be able to 
obtain at any other future point.  
It would make sense also, that infielders and outfielders are the only two positions 
where this difference is seen. A lot of high school players are selected at these positions 
to be difference making offensive threats. As discussed before, it is very hard to project 
how a player will develop as a hitter, and the younger that player is, the harder the 
projection becomes for a MLB career. Thus, the information for these positions can be 
much hazier for high school players than college players. Catchers, on the other hand, are 
known as a defensive position. They are often drafted for their arms, blocking ability, and 
ability to understand and control the pitching game. Offense at this position is usually just 
a bonus. Pitchers, as stated before, are selected for the pitches they throw, and their 
ability to harness their pitches to get batters out. Both of these skillsets are a little easier 
to project long-term, and thus, make the knowledge gap of high school and college 
prospects smaller, and allow teams to compensate them accordingly, as demonstrated by 
this study. 
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Overall, this paper confirms that there is not a lot of supporting evidence to 
conclude that the MLB Rule IV Draft operates inefficiently, by position, but there is 
evidence to believe college players outperform high school players on average at the 
infield and outfield positions. This paper suggests that teams should evaluate their 
organization, and determine where they can find the best fit to plug holes. If an 
organization is in a fortunate spot where they have a sound and deep farm system, their 
best bet is to draft the best player on their board. The team should not be concerned with 
what position they are selecting, however, if they are choosing an infielder or an 
outfielder, they should give preference to the college player unless they have strong 
inclination to believe the high school player will be one of the extremes found on the 
right side of the distribution. This conclusion also provides evidence that teams should 
allocate more resources to scouting the best college players than high school. Finally, for 
teams to have successful drafts, they must evaluate the board, depth of talent, and team 
needs. While this paper shows that there is not a statistical difference amongst positions 
on average, years like 2005 where the draft is hitter-heavy, teams may be best suited 
picking one of them early, and waiting on pitching, as it is likely offense will be going 
first if the talent is skewed in that direction. If teams evaluate the flow of the draft, they 
can potentially optimize their return in that given year. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Limitations and Future Research 
While it is my belief that this paper does provide some significant insight into the 
MLB Rule IV Draft, there are some limitations in how much the results can tell us. First, 
the MRP model built in this paper is formulated on MLB team revenue estimates, which 
are almost certainly not totally correct. MLB teams are not required to release revenue 
information, and while Forbes estimates are the best bet for possible numbers, there is 
certainly some residual effect between actual revenues and Forbes estimates. For that 
reason, the MRP model, while theoretically correct, may be produce incorrect results 
depending on how far off the revenue estimates are from reality. Additionally, there are 
some players included in this study who have not yet reached their potential, and are still 
developing in the minors. Some of these players may wind up having very successful 
MLB careers, and that could alter the results found in this paper. Finally, because this 
study limits itself to pre-arbitration, for reasons listed earlier, it excludes any return from 
players who develop later into their six-year pre-free agency period, and it is possible that 
some positions do not realize true success until after they are into arbitration. It is also 
entirely possible that none of these factors would change the results any, but they are 
worth considering when evaluating what the analysis has found. 
In the future, there are some opportunities to expand upon the research in this 
paper. Some interesting tests I think would be worth investigating would be the 
difference between left-handed and right-handed pitchers. Also, it would be interesting to 
note the success rates of players based off of their geographic regions, as some research 
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has attempted to do in the past. Finally, an analysis on MLB Draft picks as opposed to 
international free agents would be very interesting to study, as the means and cost of 
acquisition of these two different groups of players are very different. I believe that this 
study has cast light on where the MLB Draft operates efficiently and where it does not, 
and by combining this paper with future research, much more can be learned about the 
MLB Rule IV Draft and baseball prospects as a whole.  
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APPENDIX A 
Figure A-1 
Run Differential and Win Percentage 
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Figure A-2 
MLB Revenue By Year 
 
Source: Forbes 
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Figure A-3 
Total Revenue and Fan Cost Index 
 
Figure A-4 
Total Revenue and Run Differential 
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Figure A-5 
Position Player and Pitcher Mean Return by Year 
 
Returns measured in 2013 USD 
 
Figure A-6 
 
Position Player Mean Return by Position and Year 
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Figure A-7 
High School and College Mean Return by Year 
 
Returns measured in 2013 USD 
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Figure A-8 
 
Return on Investment Distribution 
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Figure A-9 
 
Position Player and Pitcher Return Distribution 
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Figure A-10 
First Round Position Player and Pitcher Return Distribution 
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Figure A-11 
Other Round Position Player and Pitcher Return Distribution 
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Figure A-12 
Offensive Return Distribution by Position 
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Figure A-13 
High School and College Player Return Distribution 
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Figure A-14  
First Round High School and College Player Return Distribution 
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Figure A-15 
Other Round High School and College Player Return Distribution 
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Figure A-16 
High School and College Catcher Return Distribution 
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Figure A-17 
High School and College Infielder Return Distribution 
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Figure A-18 
High School and College Outfielder Return Distribution 
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Figure A-19 
High School and College Pitcher Return Distribution 
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APPENDIX B 
Table B-1 
Model Variable Description 
Variable	   Description	   Measure	  
totrevmil	   Total	  Team	  Revenue	   Millions	  of	  2013	  USD	  
rd	   Team	  Runs	  Scored-­‐	  Team	  Runs	  Allowed	   Runs	  
pop	   Metropolitan	  Area	  Population	   People	  
honeymoon	   Team	  Plays	  In	  a	  New	  Ballpark	   1	  if	  8	  years	  or	  younger,	  0	  if	  not	  
fci	   Fan	  Cost	  Index	   2013	  USD	  
year	   Revenue	  Estimate	  for	  Year	  i	   1	  if	  from	  Year	  i,	  0	  if	  not	  
 
Table B-2 
Summary Statistics 
Variable	   Obs	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev	   Min	   Max	  
totrevmil	   420	   194.0138	   57.4325	   -­‐337	   300	  
rd	   420	   0.2238	   107.8387	   1	   113,569.0000	  
rdsquare	   420	   11601.54	   14,302.18	   -­‐33,800,000	   27,000,000	  
rdcube	   420	   -­‐258,939.1	   407,643	   1,502,305	   19,900,000	  
pop	   420	   5,864,319	   4,542,058	   1,502,305	   19,900,000	  
honeymoon	   420	   0.319	   0.4667	   0	   1	  
fci	   420	   197.863	   47.1929	   101.04	   446.16	  
year2000	   420	   0.0714	   0.2578	   0	   1	  
year2001	   420	   0.0714	   0.2578	   0	   1	  
year2002	   420	   0.0714	   0.2578	   0	   1	  
year2003	   420	   0.0714	   0.2578	   0	   1	  
year2004	   420	   0.0714	   0.2578	   0	   1	  
year2005	   420	   0.0714	   0.2578	   0	   1	  
year2006	   420	   0.0714	   0.2578	   0	   1	  
year2007	   420	   0.0714	   0.2578	   0	   1	  
year2008	   420	   0.0714	   0.2578	   0	   1	  
year2009	   420	   0.0714	   0.2578	   0	   1	  
year2010	   420	   0.0714	   0.2578	   0	   1	  
year2011	   420	   0.0714	   0.2578	   0	   1	  
year2012	   420	   0.0714	   0.2578	   0	   1	  
year2013	   420	   0.0714	   0.2578	   0	   1	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Table B-3 
MRP Model Results 
Variable	   Model	  1	   Model	  2	   Model	  3	   Model	  4	  
Run	  Difference	  
0.0918	  
[0.0341]***	  
0.0855	  
[0.0198]***	  
0.1301	  
[0.0272]***	  
0.09376	  
[0.0143]***	  
Run	  Difference2	  
0.0005	  
[0.0002]**	  
0.0003	  	  
[0.0001]***	  
0.0004	  
[0.0002]***	  
0.0003	  
[0.0001]***	  
Run	  Difference3	  
1.36E-­‐06	  	  	  	  
[1.15E-­‐06]	  
4.29E-­‐07	  [5.98E-­‐
07]	  
	   	  
MSA	  Population	  
6.94E-­‐06	  	  	  	  
[09.74E-­‐07]***	  
4.35E-­‐06	  [6.66e-­‐
07]***	  
6.92E-­‐06	  
[9.75E-­‐07]***	  
4.33E-­‐06	  
[6.61e-­‐
07]***	  
Honeymoon	  
19.6288	  
[6.14674]***	  
13.7019	  
[3.9212]***	  
19.7280	  
[6.1965]***	  
13.6779	  
[3.9101]***	  
FCI	  
	  
0.5561	  
[0.0411]***	  
	  
0.5592	  
[0.0404]***	  
Year	  2000	  
	  
-­‐74.0140	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[7.5077]***	  
	  
-­‐73.9911	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[-­‐
7.4829]***	  
Year	  2001	  
	  
-­‐65.6641	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[8.0461]***	  
	  
-­‐65.2966	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[7.9831]***	  
Year	  2002	  
	  
-­‐67.7572	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[7.7949]***	  
	  
-­‐67.7493	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[7.7989]***	  
Year	  2003	  
	  
-­‐60.1615	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[7.5843]***	  
	  
-­‐60.5336	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[7.6411]***	  
Year	  2004	  
	  
-­‐50.6138	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[8.0337]***	  
	  
-­‐50.8140	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[8.0300]***	  
Year	  2005	  
	  
-­‐34.1317	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[7.8918]***	  
	  
-­‐34.2467	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[7.9141]***	  
Year	  2006	  
	  
-­‐31.6930	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[7.9536]***	  
	  
-­‐31.8829	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[7.9679]***	  
Year	  2007	  
	  
-­‐23.5719	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[7.8136]***	  
	  
-­‐23.5092	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[7.8057]***	  
Year	  2008	  
	  
-­‐24.5042	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[8.5359]***	  
	  
-­‐24.5925	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[8.5382]***	  
Year	  2009	  
	  
-­‐23.9492	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[7.8894]***	  
	  
-­‐24.0367	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[7.8968]***	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***,**,*: Significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively 
Table B-4 
Fielding Positional Adjustments 
Position	   Adjustment	  
Catcher	   42	  
First	  Base	   13	  
Second	  Base	   32	  
Shortstop	   36	  
Third	  Base	   25	  
Left	  Field	   19	  
Center	  Field	   29	  
Right	  Field	   20	  
Designated	  Hitter	   -­‐7	  
Pitcher	   2	  
As reported in the Fielding Bible by John Dewan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year	  2010	  
	  
-­‐16.5202	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[8.5798]**	  
	  
-­‐16.8388	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[8.5703]**	  
Year	  2011	  
	  
-­‐13.5385	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[8.3834]	  
	  
-­‐13.4693	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[8.3831]	  
Year	  2012	  
	  
-­‐5.9114	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[6.8350]	  
	  
-­‐6.1311	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[6.8113]	  
Constant	  
141.4984	  
[7.4146]***	  
85.3087	  
[9.7715]***	  
142.1545	  
[7.4013]***	  
85.0972	  
[9.7655]***	  
Observations	   420	   420	   420	   420	  
R2	   0.41	   0.82	   0.42	   0.82	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Table B-5 
MRP Model v One-Year Free Agent Contracts Using Replacement 
Player	   2015	  Salary	   MRP	  Estimate	  
Absolute	  Value	  
Difference	  
Alex	  Rios	   10,824,407.78	   8,149,137.55	   2,675,270.23	  
Torii	  Hunter	   10,332,389.24	   9,908,996.38	   423,392.86	  
Colby	  Rasmus	   7,872,296.57	   9,884,799.36	   2,012,502.79	  
Asdrubal	  Cabrera	   7,380,278.03	   9,474,259.70	   2,093,981.67	  
Stephen	  Drew	   4,920,185.35	   6,332,068.90	   1,411,883.55	  
Hitter	  Average	  Difference	   1,723,406.22	   Hitter	  St.	  Dev	  Difference	   853,526.39	  
Brett	  Anderson	   9,840,370.71	   4,796,053.51	   5,044,317.20	  
Justin	  Masterson	   9,348,352.17	   10,934,389.75	   1,586,037.58	  
AJ	  Burnett	   8,364,315.10	   9,875,143.75	   1,510,828.65	  
Kyle	  Kendrick	   5,412,203.89	   5,685,630.32	   273,426.43	  
Chris	  Capuano	   4,920,185.35	   4,586,954.00	   333,231.35	  
Pitcher	  Average	  
Difference	   1,749,568.24	  
Pitcher	  St.	  Dev	  
Difference	   1,944,486.72	  
Total	  Average	  Difference	   1,736,487.23	   Total	  St.	  Dev	  Difference	   1,415,778.34	  
All monetary values are adjusted to 2013 USD	  
Table B-6 
 
MRP Model v One-Year Free Agent Contracts Raw 
 
Player	   2015	  Salary	   MRP	  Estimate	  
Absolute	  Value	  
Difference	  
Alex	  Rios	   10,824,407.78	   8,793,755.05	   2,030,652.73	  
Torii	  Hunter	   10,332,389.24	   10,803,027.59	   470,638.35	  
Colby	  Rasmus	   7,872,296.57	   11,095,533.87	   3,223,237.30	  
Asdrubal	  Cabrera	   7,380,278.03	   10,094,634.10	   2,714,356.07	  
Stephen	  Drew	   4,920,185.35	   6,551,922.06	   1,631,736.71	  
Hitter	  Average	  Difference	   2,014,124.23	   Hitter	  St.	  Dev	  Difference	   1,058,432.94	  
Brett	  Anderson	   9,840,370.71	   5,099,163.40	   4,741,207.31	  
Justin	  Masterson	   9,348,352.17	   12,336,229.77	   2,987,877.60	  
AJ	  Burnett	   8,364,315.10	   10,998,779.07	   2,634,463.97	  
Kyle	  Kendrick	   5,412,203.89	   6,131,849.96	   719,646.07	  
Chris	  Capuano	   4,920,185.35	   4,883,902.82	   36,282.53	  
Pitcher	  Average	  
Difference	   2,223,895.50	  
Pitcher	  St.	  Dev	  
Difference	   1,879,994.06	  
Total	  Average	  Difference	   2,119,009.86	   Total	  St.	  Dev	  Difference	   1,442,553.36	  
All monetary values are adjusted to 2013 USD	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Table B-7 
 
MRP Model v One-Year Free Agent Contracts Using Average 
Player	   2015	  Salary	   MRP	  Estimate	  
Absolute	  Value	  
Difference	  
Alex	  Rios	   10,824,407.78	   8,901,139.45	   1,923,268.33	  
Torii	  Hunter	   10,332,389.24	   11,132,950.86	   800,561.62	  
Colby	  Rasmus	   7,872,296.57	   10,269,934.07	   2,397,637.50	  
Asdrubal	  Cabrera	   7,380,278.03	   10,497,587.91	   3,117,309.88	  
Stephen	  Drew	   4,920,185.35	   6,961,192.90	   2,041,007.55	  
Hitter	  Average	  Difference	   2,055,956.97	   Hitter	  St.	  Dev	  Difference	   842,179.14	  
Brett	  Anderson	   9,840,370.71	   5,169,760.33	   4,670,610.38	  
Justin	  Masterson	   9,348,352.17	   12,260,674.78	   2,912,322.61	  
AJ	  Burnett	   8,364,315.10	   11,235,226.09	   2,870,910.99	  
Kyle	  Kendrick	   5,412,203.89	   6,011,177.85	   598,973.96	  
Chris	  Capuano	   4,920,185.35	   4,825,138.01	   95,047.34	  
Pitcher	  Average	  
Difference	   2,229,573.05	  
Pitcher	  St.	  Dev	  
Difference	   1,874,245.05	  
Total	  Average	  Difference	   2,142,765.01	   Total	  St.	  Dev	  Difference	   1,372,896.25	  
All monetary values are adjusted to 2013 USD	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Table B-8 
 
Highest Annual MRPs 
 
Draft	  Year	   Pick	  #	   Season	   Player	   Pos	   HS/C	   Rep	  TRC	   RAR	   $	  Worth	  
2000	   15	   2006	   Chase	  Utley	   IF	   C	   89.62	   94.91	   23,077,421.58	  
2001	   2	   2003	   Mark	  Prior	   P	   C	   68.28	   112.64	   22,819,284.91	  
2008	   96	   2012	   Craig	  Kimbrel	   P	   C	   17.53	   144.41	   22,114,544.67	  
2009	   25	   2012	   Mike	  Trout	   OF	   HS	   69.15	   106.91	   22,004,252.13	  
2005	   7	   2007	   Troy	  Tulowitzki	   IF	   C	   85.29	   83.46	   20,701,762.64	  
2006	   7	   2011	   Clayton	  Kershaw	   P	   HS	   67.01	   99.70	   20,560,463.97	  
2002	   57	   2009	   Jon	  Lester	   P	   HS	   69.25	   96.42	   20,357,469.72	  
2004	   65	   2008	   Dustin	  Pedroia	   IF	   C	   80.99	   84.11	   20,165,486.14	  
2006	   10	   2009	   Tim	  Lincecum	   P	   C	   69.95	   93.33	   19,978,691.54	  
2002	   80	   2007	   Curtis	  Granderson	   OF	   C	   80.26	   83.57	   19,977,496.69	  
2000	   75	   2006	   Grady	  Sizemore	   OF	   HS	   87.52	   75.27	   19,847,203.41	  
2009	   25	   2013	   Mike	  Trout	   OF	   HS	   77.60	   84.70	   19,760,443.34	  
2003	   7	   2008	   Nick	  Markakis	   OF	   C	   81.68	   80.37	   19,716,905.55	  
2000	   15	   2005	   Chase	  Utley	   IF	   C	   73.09	   88.43	   19,674,654.65	  
2001	   5	   2005	   Mark	  Teixeira	   IF	   C	   75.91	   85.55	   19,644,667.70	  
2006	   10	   2008	   Tim	  Lincecum	   P	   C	   72.47	   86.57	   19,307,835.42	  
2001	   72	   2006	   Dan	  Haren	   P	   C	   79.21	   79.08	   19,170,257.50	  
2005	   7	   2009	   Troy	  Tulowitzki	   IF	   C	   78.38	   76.57	   18,688,106.52	  
2006	   3	   2010	   Evan	  Longoria	   IF	   C	   66.97	   86.95	   18,598,999.10	  
2006	   3	   2009	   Evan	  Longoria	   IF	   C	   74.67	   77.14	   18,237,879.69	  
2007	   1	   2011	   David	  Price	   P	   C	   70.60	   80.67	   18,175,512.76	  
2000	   75	   2007	   Grady	  Sizemore	   OF	   HS	   81.35	   69.23	   18,083,275.73	  
2002	   15	   2007	   Scott	  Kazmir	   P	   HS	   72.15	   78.53	   18,081,997.28	  
2002	   44	   2010	   Joey	  Votto	   IF	   HS	   57.02	   91.72	   17,980,688.06	  
2005	   11	   2012	  
Andrew	  
McCutchen	   OF	   HS	   75.80	   73.53	   17,884,671.69	  
2009	   25	   2014	   Mike	  Trout	   OF	   HS	   71.40	   76.19	   17,640,403.46	  
2002	   17	   2008	   Cole	  Hamels	   P	   HS	   73.13	   73.19	   17,458,393.40	  
2007	   48	   2013	   Josh	  Donaldson	   C	   C	   66.88	   78.71	   17,375,210.80	  
2000	   75	   2005	   Grady	  Sizemore	   OF	   HS	   74.01	   70.84	   17,251,444.32	  
2002	   24	   2007	   Joe	  Blanton	   P	   C	   80.98	   63.24	   17,208,245.97	  
2005	   5	   2009	   Ryan	  Braun	   IF	   C	   77.13	   67.24	   17,197,820.89	  
2005	   4	   2007	   Ryan	  Zimmerman	   IF	   C	   83.34	   57.37	   16,770,148.07	  
2001	   72	   2005	   Dan	  Haren	   P	   C	   73.68	   67.42	   16,729,585.03	  
2005	   5	   2010	   Ryan	  Braun	   IF	   C	   73.61	   67.42	   16,720,928.93	  
2001	   1	   2006	   Joe	  Mauer	   C	   HS	   72.81	   67.97	   16,682,888.58	  
2003	   13	   2007	   Aaron	  Hill	   IF	   C	   78.77	   61.38	   16,636,343.66	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2007	   14	   2012	   Jason	  Heyward	   OF	   HS	   59.85	   79.75	   16,575,326.07	  
2002	   55	   2006	   David	  Bush	   P	   C	   71.28	   67.81	   16,445,543.03	  
2008	   5	   2012	   Buster	  Posey	   C	   C	   71.03	   66.69	   16,257,118.12	  
2007	   48	   2014	   Josh	  Donaldson	   C	   C	   63.34	   72.12	   15,952,089.74	  
2005	   5	   2008	   Ryan	  Braun	   IF	   C	   64.18	   70.15	   15,790,819.55	  
2003	   7	   2007	   Nick	  Markakis	   OF	   C	   82.69	   50.01	   15,721,427.12	  
2004	   2	   2007	   Justin	  Verlander	   P	   C	   70.81	   62.80	   15,695,459.96	  
2002	   64	   2008	   Brian	  McCann	   C	   C	   78.11	   54.82	   15,674,727.60	  
2005	   11	   2011	  
Andrew	  
McCutchen	   OF	   HS	   78.25	   54.43	   15,643,920.34	  
2007	   14	   2010	   Jason	  Heyward	   OF	   HS	   56.86	   75.45	   15,559,624.17	  
2002	   9	   2007	   Jeff	  Francis	   P	   C	   72.76	   59.39	   15,512,479.29	  
2001	   38	   2005	   David	  Wright	   IF	   HS	   63.20	   69.08	   15,508,699.22	  
2001	   38	   2006	   David	  Wright	   IF	   HS	   67.01	   64.86	   15,447,783.47	  
2003	   28	   2010	   Daric	  Barton	   C	   HS	   57.20	   74.30	   15,439,555.43	  
	  
Table B-9 
Top 50 MLB Salaries for 2015 
	  
Player	   Position	   2015	  Salary	  
Clayton	  Kershaw	   P	   32,571,428.00	  
Justin	  Verlander	   P	   28,000,000.00	  
Josh	  Hamilton	   OF	   25,400,000.00	  
Cliff	  Lee	   P	   25,000,000.00	  
Ryan	  Howard	   IF	   25,000,000.00	  
Zack	  Greinke	   P	   25,000,000.00	  
Felix	  Hernandez	   P	   24,857,142.00	  
Albert	  Pujols	   IF	   24,000,000.00	  
Robinson	  Cano	   IF	   24,000,000.00	  
Prince	  Fielder	   IF	   24,000,000.00	  
Cole	  Hamels	   P	   23,500,000.00	  
Mark	  Teixeira	   IF	   23,125,000.00	  
C.C.	  Sbathia	   P	   23,000,000.00	  
Joe	  Mauer	   IF	   23,000,000.00	  
Jose	  Reyes	   IF	   22,000,000.00	  
Masahiro	  Tanaka	   P	   22,000,000.00	  
Alex	  Rodriguez	   IF	   22,000,000.00	  
Miguel	  Cabrera	   IF	   22,000,000.00	  
Adrian	  Gonzalez	   IF	   21,857,142.00	  
Jayson	  Werth	   OF	   21,571,428.00	  
Carl	  Crawford	   OF	   21,357,142.00	  
Matt	  Kemp	   OF	   21,250,000.00	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Jacoby	  Ellsbury	   OF	   21,142,857.00	  
Matt	  Cain	   P	   20,833,333.00	  
Jon	  Lester	   P	   20,000,000.00	  
David	  Wright	   IF	   20,000,000.00	  
Troy	  Tulowitzki	   IF	   20,000,000.00	  
Mark	  Buehrle	   P	   20,000,000.00	  
David	  Price	   P	   19,750,000.00	  
Hanley	  Ramirez	   OF	   19,750,000.00	  
Adam	  Wainwright	   P	   19,500,000.00	  
C.J.	  Wilson	   P	   18,500,000.00	  
Hunter	  Pence	   OF	   18,500,000.00	  
Jered	  Weaver	   P	   18,200,000.00	  
Andre	  Ethier	   OF	   18,000,000.00	  
Time	  Lincecum	   P	   18,000,000.00	  
Pablo	  Sandoval	   IF	   17,600,000.00	  
Buster	  Posey	   C	   17,277,777.00	  
Max	  Scherzer	   P	   17,142,857.00	  
Brian	  McCann	   C	   17,000,000.00	  
Matt	  Holliday	   OF	   17,000,000.00	  
Anibal	  Sanchez	   P	   16,800,000.00	  
Jordan	  
Zimmermann	   P	   16,500,000.00	  
Carlos	  Gonzalez	   OF	   16,428,571.00	  
Adrian	  Beltre	   IF	   16,000,000.00	  
Ian	  Kinsler	   IF	   16,000,000.00	  
David	  Ortiz	   IF	   16,000,000.00	  
Mike	  Napoli	   IF	   16,000,000.00	  
Curtis	  Granderson	   OF	   16,000,000.00	  
John	  Danks	   P	   15,750,000.00	  
As reported by Spotrac, all values are 2015 USD 
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Table B-10 
Highest Return on Investment 
 
Draft	  Year	   Round	  Picked	   Overall	   Player	   Position	   Return	  (2013	  USD)	  
2009	   1	   25	   Mike	  Trout	   OF	   57,956,578.34	  
2000	   3	   75	   Grady	  Sizemore	   OF	   53,097,381.04	  
2005	   1	   5	   Ryan	  Braun	   IF	   52,870,562.36	  
2005	   1	   11	   Andrew	  McCutchen	   OF	   52,693,630.54	  
2002	   3	   80	   Curtis	  Granderson	   OF	   49,455,925.26	  
2000	   1	   15	   Chase	  Utley	   IF	   47,252,485.49	  
2006	   1	   7	   Clayton	  Kershaw	   P	   45,662,531.76	  
2006	   1	   10	   Tim	  Lincecum	   P	   44,930,467.91	  
2006	   1	   3	   Evan	  Longoria	   IF	   43,524,400.29	  
2005	   2	   75	   Yunel	  Escobar	   IF	   43,495,801.83	  
2005	   1	   7	   Troy	  Tulowitzki	   IF	   42,985,996.86	  
2003	   2	   58	   Scott	  Baker	   P	   42,935,771.99	  
2003	   1	   7	   Nick	  Markakis	   OF	   42,891,420.80	  
2007	   1	   10	   Madison	  Bumgarner	   P	   42,818,868.84	  
2002	   2	   44	   Joey	  Votto	   IF	   42,056,990.97	  
2002	   1	   15	   Scott	  Kazmir	   P	   41,243,987.48	  
2002	   2	   55	   David	  Bush	   P	   41,152,597.31	  
2007	   2	   76	   Giancarlo	  Stanton	   OF	   40,877,115.24	  
2008	   3	   96	   Craig	  Kimbrel	   P	   39,659,322.08	  
2004	   1	   12	   Jered	  Weaver	   P	   39,489,863.05	  
2002	   2	   57	   Jon	  Lester	   P	   39,405,667.81	  
2002	   2	   64	   Brian	  McCann	   C	   39,355,783.09	  
2006	   2	   71	   Justin	  Masterson	   P	   39,186,372.18	  
2001	   2	   72	   Dan	  Haren	   P	   39,125,436.14	  
2001	   1	   2	   Mark	  Prior	   P	   39,044,672.00	  
2002	   1	   17	   Cole	  Hamels	   P	   38,990,213.46	  
2002	   1	   24	   Joe	  Blanton	   P	   38,931,137.12	  
2001	   3	   78	   Ryan	  Theriot	   IF	   38,852,255.12	  
2004	   2	   67	   Kurt	  Suzuki	   C	   38,116,440.36	  
2009	   3	   82	   Kyle	  Seager	   IF	   37,927,600.13	  
2002	   1	   23	   Jeff	  Francoeur	   OF	   37,828,635.51	  
2007	   1	   14	   Jason	  Heyward	   OF	   37,564,059.57	  
2003	   1	   13	   Aaron	  Hill	   IF	   37,028,146.54	  
2003	   1	   24	   Chad	  Billingsley	   P	   36,861,507.03	  
2004	   2	   64	   Hunter	  Pence	   OF	   36,817,154.33	  
2005	   1	   4	   Ryan	  Zimmerman	   IF	   36,349,813.22	  
2007	   1	   48	   Josh	  Donaldson	   C	   35,744,887.89	  
2007	   1	   5	   Matt	  Wieters	   C	   35,617,764.39	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2004	   1	   2	   Justin	  Verlander	   P	   35,562,080.02	  
2001	   1	   38	   David	  Wright	   IF	   35,410,507.98	  
2002	   1	   25	   Matt	  Cain	   P	   35,117,780.66	  
2001	   1	   26	   Jeremy	  Bonderman	   P	   34,596,173.07	  
2006	   1	   11	   Max	  Scherzer	   P	   34,573,025.19	  
2002	   1	   9	   Jeff	  Francis	   P	   34,505,378.92	  
2006	   2	   66	   Trevor	  Cahill	   P	   34,390,550.26	  
2002	   1	   16	   Nick	  Swisher	   OF	   34,374,406.62	  
2009	   2	   63	   Jason	  Kipnis	   OF	   34,336,554.17	  
2006	   1	   21	   Ian	  Kennedy	   P	   34,128,497.88	  
2001	   1	   5	   Mark	  Teixeira	   IF	   34,101,737.16	  
2003	   1	   9	   John	  Danks	   P	   34,037,693.81	  
Return is measured in 2013 USD 
 
Table B-11 
 
Position Players v Pitchers 
 
Group	  
Position	  
Players	   Pitchers	  
Obs	   469	   492	  
25%	   -­‐882,737	   -­‐892,322	  
Median	   -­‐517,462	   -­‐477,155	  
75%	   	  12,500,000	  	   	  8,880,495	  	  
IQR	   	  13,382,737	  	   	  9,772,817	  	  
Max	   	  58,000,000	  	   	  45,700,000	  	  
Min	   -­‐6,947,075	   -­‐4,271,194	  
Mean	   	  7,087,449	  	   	  5,761,469	  	  
	   	   	  D	  Stat	   0.0622	  
	  * Represents significance of D statistic at 5% level 
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Table B-12 
First Round Position Players v Pitchers 
Group	  
Position	  
Players	   Pitchers	  
Obs	   204	   235	  
25%	   -­‐1,455,200	   -­‐1,246,073	  
Median	   5,506,365	   1,319,972	  
75%	   	  20,400,000	  	   	  13,000,000	  	  
IQR	   21,855,200	   14,246,073	  
Max	   	  58,000,000	  	   	  45,700,000	  	  
Min	   -­‐6,947,075	   -­‐4,271,194	  
Mean	   	  10,400,000	  	   7,680,994	  
	   	   	  D	  Stat	   0.1331*	  
	  * Represents significance of D statistic at 5% level 
Table B-13 
First Round Position Players v Pitchers Excluding 2005 
Group	  
Position	  
Players	   Pitchers	  
Obs	   182	   210	  
25%	   -­‐1,497,896	   -­‐1,253,807	  
Median	   2,630,536	   1,396,153	  
75%	   	  19,300,000	  	   	  13,200,000	  	  
IQR	   	  20,797,896	  	   	  14,453,807	  	  
Max	   	  58,000,000	  	   	  45,700,000	  	  
Min	   -­‐6,947,075	   -­‐4,271,194	  
Mean	   	  9,449,917	  	   	  7,890,775	  	  
	   	   	  D	  Stat	   0.0985	  
	  * Represents significance of D statistic at 5% level 
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Table B-14 
Other Round Position Players v Pitchers 
Group	  
Position	  
Players	   Pitchers	  
Obs	   265	   257	  
25%	   -­‐760,374	   -­‐771,233	  
Median	   -­‐553,251	   -­‐543,250	  
75%	   3,119,521	   4,256,810	  
IQR	   3,879,895	   5,028,043	  
Max	   	  53,100,000	  	   	  42,900,000	  	  
Min	   -­‐2,791,855	   -­‐1,606,428	  
Mean	   4,524,859	   4,006,261	  
	   	   	  D	  Stat	   0.0394	  
	  * Represents significance of D statistic at 5% level 
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Table B-15 
Offensive Position Comparison 
Group	   Catchers	   Infielders	   Outfielders	  
Obs	   78	   230	   161	  
25%	   -­‐939,607	   -­‐899,630	   -­‐881,482	  
Median	   -­‐572,405	   -­‐425,335	   -­‐544,712	  
75%	   8,534,248	   	  14,400,000	  	   	  13,800,000	  	  
IQR	   9,473,855	   	  15,299,630	  	   	  14,681,482	  	  
Max	   	  39,400,000	  	   	  52,900,000	  	   	  58,000,000	  	  
Min	   -­‐3,004,278	   -­‐6,947,075	   -­‐6,812,643	  
Mean	   5,377,773	   7,771,003	   6,939,234	  
	   	   	   	  C	  v	  IF	  D	  Stat	   0.1179	  
	   	  C	  v	  OF	  D	  
Stat	   0.0814	  
	   	  IF	  v	  OF	  D	  
Stat	   0.0988	  
	   	  * Represents significance of D statistic at 5% level 
 
Table B-16 
High School v College Players 
Group	   High	  School	   College	  
Obs	   414	   547	  
25%	   -­‐1,019,922	   -­‐820,230.90	  
Median	   -­‐601,177.40	   -­‐3,188,468	  
75%	   7,407,729	   	  12,300,000	  	  
IQR	   8,427,651	   13,120,231	  
Max	   	  58,000,000	  	   	  52,900,000	  	  
Min	   -­‐6,947,075	   -­‐4,271,194	  
Mean	   5,641,068	   6,989,496	  
	   	   	  D	  Stat	   0.1571*	  
	  * Represents significance of D statistic at 5% level 
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Table B-17 
First Round High School v College 
Group	   High	  School	   College	  
Obs	   193	   246	  
25%	   -­‐1,559,146	   -­‐1,178,751	  
Median	   -­‐357,217	   5,276,402	  
75%	   	  16,800,000	  	   	  17,600,000	  	  
IQR	   18,359,146	   18,778,751	  
Max	   	  58,000,000	  	   	  52,900,000	  	  
Min	   -­‐6,947,075	   -­‐4,271,194	  
Mean	   7,855,764	   9,812,184	  
	   	   	  D	  Stat	   0.1483*	  
	  * Represents significance of D statistic at 5% level 
Table B-18 
Other Round High School v College 
Group	   High	  School	   College	  
Obs	   221	   301	  
25%	   -­‐819,124	   -­‐716,167	  
Median	   -­‐602,500	   -­‐486,318	  
75%	   116,251	   4,827,423	  
IQR	   935,375	   5,543,590	  
Max	   53,100,000	   49,500,000	  
Min	   -­‐2,791,855	   -­‐2,661,463	  
Mean	   3,706,966	   4,682,582	  
	   	   	  D	  Stat	   0.1808*	  
	  * Represents significance of D statistic at 5% level 
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Table B-19 
High School v College Catchers 
Group	   High	  School	   College	  
Obs	   36	   42	  
25%	   -­‐1,080,142	   -­‐821,337	  
Median	   -­‐606,409	   -­‐387,126	  
75%	   7,574,768	   	  12,500,000	  	  
IQR	   8,654,910	   13,321,367	  
Max	   39,400,000	   38,100,000	  
Min	   -­‐3,004,278	   -­‐1,982,863	  
Mean	   4,536,815	   6,098,595	  
	   	   	  D	  Stat	   0.1667	  
	  * Represents significance of D statistic at 5% level 
Table B-20 
High School v College Infielders 
Group	   High	  School	   College	  
Obs	   109	   121	  
25%	   -­‐1,101,734	   -­‐745,303	  
Median	   -­‐602,500	   2,457,344	  
75%	   6,733,935	   16,600,000	  
IQR	   7,835,669	   17,345,303	  
Max	   43,500,000	   	  52,900,000	  	  
Min	   -­‐6,947,075	   -­‐2,927,754	  
Mean	   5,628,829	   9,700,731	  
	   	   	  D	  Stat	   0.2116*	  
	  * Represents significance of D statistic at 5% level 
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Table B-21 
High School v College Outfielders 
Group	   High	  School	   College	  
Obs	   76	   85	  
25%	   -­‐1,096,771	   -­‐729,662	  
Median	   -­‐673,170	   -­‐319,232	  
75%	   7,844,363	   14,900,000	  
IQR	   8,941,134	   15,629,662	  
Max	   58,000,000	   49,500,000	  
Min	   -­‐6,812,643	   -­‐3,128,590	  
Mean	   6,501,663	   7,330,473	  
	   	   	  D	  Stat	   0.2406*	  
	  * Represents significance of D statistic at 5% level 
Table B-22 
High School v College Pitchers 
Group	   High	  School	   College	  
Obs	   193	   299	  
25%	   -­‐968,242	   -­‐865,345	  
Median	   -­‐587,415	   -­‐362,556	  
75%	   7,407,729	   9,028,367	  
IQR	   8,375,971	   9,893,712	  
Max	   45,700,000	   44,900,000	  
Min	   -­‐3,437,153	   -­‐4,271,194	  
Mean	   5,515,067	   5,920,518	  
	   	   	  D	  Stat	   0.1198	  
	  * Represents significance of D statistic at 5% level 
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